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Abstract 
 
The passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 and subsequent establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau marked 
an unexpected victory for consumers across America at the expense of the well-financed 
business lobby. Although classical social scientists, such as Mancur Olson, claim that 
consumer movements should fail to emerge due to the difficulty of providing public 
goods for large constituencies, consumer victories – like the passage of Dodd-Frank— 
have occurred in waves throughout the last century. In conducting this study, I thus 
sought to answer why it is that some consumer movements are able to push through 
consumer legislation while others fail. In order to answer this question, I conducted two 
cases studies, comparing Ralph Nader’s failed attempt to establish a Consumer Protection 
Agency in the 1970s with Elizabeth Warren’s successful push to create Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau in 2010. Ultimately my research demonstrates that three 
variables are critical to the passage of consumer legislation: 1) the opening of a policy 
window via key events, 2) the existence of favorable structural conditions in the policy 
making process, and 3) the ability of political entrepreneurs to utilize successful 
legislative and framing strategies that help them advance their agenda within the broader 
environmental context. Based upon these determinants, I suggest that a policy window 
has been opened for the consumer movement following the 2008 financial crisis due to an 
ideological shift from Friedman to Keynes which primed the current environment, the 
support of a Progressive Democratic President, and strong public support for consumer 
protection.  
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Part I: Introduction 
 
“Welcome to the Showdown in Chicago. We have come together 
to reclaim America and hold Wall Street accountable. Imagine a 
story as terrible as this, the same financial institutions that created 
the crisis, sent the economy into a tailspin, handed out bonuses on 
top of bonuses, and needed hundreds of billions of dollars of 
taxpayers money, are back in business as usual. They are spending 
millions on Capitol Hill trying to defeat legislation that would help 
ordinary people and strengthen our economy… We have come 
here in Chicago because we are sick and tired of being sick and 
tired, but we are also here because we have hope because we know 
America can do better. It is time to put the people first.”1  
 
      - Reverend Eugene Barnes, Central Illinois Organizing Project 
 
 
 Between October 25 and the October 27, 2009, some eight thousand protestors 
converged upon the Sheraton in downtown Chicago. Toting signs with Dorothea Lange’s 
famous photo of a Depression Era mother, activists marched toward the American 
Bankers Association’s convention, chanting, “Bust up big banks” and “ABA you’re the 
worst, it’s time to put the people first!”2 This initial protest evolved into a consumer 
movement that would later sweep the nation. In what some scholars have characterized as 
the fourth consumer movement in America,
3
 working-class citizens united to demand the 
representation of their interests on a federal level and the breakup of what Simon Johnson 
has dubbed the “American financial oligarchy”, Wall Street firms and banks supported 
mainly by Republican members of Congress who have shaped policy in Washington in 
their favor for the past quarter of a century.
4
 Incensed consumer advocates claimed that 
                                                        
1 Mary Bottari, “From the Big Showdown in Chicago,” Common Dreams: Building Progressive 
Community, October 26, 2009. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2009/10/26-5 
2 Mary Bottari, “From the Big Showdown in Chicago.” 
3 Lizabeth Cohen, Colston E. Warne Lecture: “Is it Time for Another Round of Consumer Protection? 
The Lessons of Twentieth-Century U.S. History”, The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 44, no. 1 (2010), 
234-246 
4 Simon Johnson, “The Quiet Coup,” The Atlantic, May 2009 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet-coup/307364/ 
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the very banks that had caused the 2008 financial crisis were now using taxpayer bailout 
funds in order to campaign against financial reform that intended to protect the consumer. 
Advocates called for the reversal of Washington’s deregulatory stance that had led to the 
loss of millions of jobs, skyrocketing interest rates on credit cards, and the depletion of 
pensions. They beseeched Congress to implement meaningful reform and to create a 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency, an independent regulatory body that could act on 
behalf of consumer interests on a federal level.  
 Leading the consumer charge was Americans for Financial Reform, a coalition of 
some 250 consumer, housing and labor groups, formed by U.S Public Interest Research 
Group (PIRG). Opposition to the legislation came from Wall Street bankers, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and the American Bankers Association. From the start, the vast 
and dispersed consumer interest found itself at a disadvantage to the highly concentrated 
and well-funded financial sector. Classical public goods theory, as espoused by Olson 
and expanded upon by others, states that non-rival and non-excludable goods can only be 
provided by a small privileged group who are willing to foot the costs of a public good 
due to the promise of disproportionate future gains. From this theoretical perspective, the 
financial sector ought to significantly outperform consumers when lobbying for 
legislative reform. The financial sector is a smaller group with deeper pockets that tends 
to be united by similar interests. Conversely, consumers are a vast and heterogeneous 
group. They tend to have limited resources and disparate interests that prevent them from 
cohering under a common cause.
5
 
                                                        
5 While the Americans for Financial Reform had a fixed budget of 2 million dollars, the U.S. Chamber of 
commerce spent that much on its media campaign alone. Some estimates put total Wall Street 
lobbying expenditures at 500 million dollars. 
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  Despite their disadvantage as a diverse and underfunded group, the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 marked 
a significant win for consumerists. Passage of Dodd-Frank seems to contradict what 
theory might lead us to expect and presents a puzzle that lies at the heart of this thesis. 
For although theory suggests that they shouldn’t emerge, consumer victories have been 
peppered throughout history—as one can see with the emergence of anti-trust laws 
following the Industrial Revolution or with the creation of the Consumer’s Union to test 
and publicize product results for the average consumer as part of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s New Deal. Although theory may suggest otherwise, consumer movements 
often have successfully lobbied against the more-concentrated business sector to codify 
their interests in law. In conducting this study, I have sought answers to why it is that 
some consumer movements, despite being generally underfunded and lacking the 
cohesion that concentrated interest groups enjoy, are able to push through consumer 
legislation while others fail. More specifically, I seek to identify particular determinants 
that mark a successful consumer movement. 
 In order to answer these questions, I conducted two case studies. First I examined 
Ralph Nader’s failed attempt to establish a Consumer Protection Agency in the 1970s. I 
then compared this failed attempt with the Elizabeth Warren and the Americans for 
Financial Reform’s successful creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 
2010. At the dawn of the 2008 consumer movement, there was a widespread expectation 
that groups such as Occupy Wall Street would fail to bring about real change. The wild-
eyed enthusiasm of its supporters seemed destined for disappointment. After all we had 
seen such failed movements in the past, most notably in the 1970s when Ralph Nader 
 9 
spearheaded a highly motivated movement for consumer protection. At the time, many 
factors seemed to favor the consumer protection movement, including a tidal wave of 
public support, a strongly Democratic Congress and a general trend toward increased 
regulations across a wide range of policy domains – especially in areas such as consumer 
safety and the environment. Yet, by the end of the decade the movement had largely 
withered away and a new age of financial deregulation dawned. Based upon this 
historical pattern, commentators and politicians at the beginning of the consumer 
movement in 2008 deemed it unlikely that this movement would be different. This time, 
however, was different, and it was consumer interests that prevailed. Comparing these 
two cases thus proved ideal in answering my previous question of why some consumer 
movements prove successful in enacting legislation while others fail.  
 While my case studies focused upon the consumer movement’s goal to enact a 
federal regulatory agency promoting its interests, I believe that my findings can be 
generalized across this genre of public laws. In framing the case studies, I drew upon the 
theoretical insights of Robert Mayer and John W. Kingdon to structure the analysis 
around an examination of environmental and tactical determinants of legislative success. 
Ultimately, my research demonstrates that there are three critical variables that are tied to 
successful passage of consumer legislation: 1) the opening of a policy window via key 
events, 2) the existence of favorable structural conditions in the policy making process, 
and 3) effective leadership by political entrepreneurs and their ability to find legislative 
and framing strategies that help them advance their agenda within the broader 
environmental context. Practical implications of my findings suggest that the 2008 
financial crisis has opened a new policy window for the consumer movement. The 
 10 
movement has gained considerable momentum in light of a shift in regulatory norms 
from the free market notions advanced by Friedman to the government interventionist 
stance advanced by Keynes. Current positive environmental factors— a Progressive 
Democratic President and public opinion in favor of consumer protection – strengthen 
this momentum. Although these environmental factors may shift in the future, for the 
time being a significant opportunity has been presented to consumer advocates.  
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Part II: Setting the Stage and a Literature Review 
 
The Definition and Origins of Social Movements 
 On the broadest level, the consumer movement can be thought of as a social 
movement, a union of individuals and institutions to advance particular political and 
social projects. Two scholars have been particularly influential in defining social 
movements—Charles Tilly and Sydney Tarrow. For Tilly, social movements are 
contentious performances through which the populace expresses a collective claim.  Tilly 
divides social movements into three key factors: 1) a campaign, 2) the social movement 
repertoire, 3) WUNC displays.
6
 A campaign is a “sustained, organized public effort 
making collective claims on target authorities.”7 The social movement repertoire includes 
all the tools which individuals use in order to make their claims—public demonstrations, 
vigils, rallies, pamphlets and statements in the media. These activities provide 
employment opportunities and potential material incentives for participants. Finally, 
participants represent worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment on behalf of the 
constituents (WUNC) in their displays.  
  Tarrow defines social movements as “collective challenges, based on common 
purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and 
authorities.”8  Breaking the definition into its constituent parts, Tarrow identifies four 
features key to a social movement: collective challenge, common purpose, social 
solidarity and sustained interaction. First, at the heart of a movement lies a collective 
                                                        
6 Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004, (Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2004) p. 3-4.  
7 Tilly, Social Movements, 3 
8 Sydney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics Ed. 2, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4 
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challenge expressed through contention. Tarrow attributes this element of strife to the 
structure of social movements. Since leaders of social movements lack “stable 
resources—money, organization, access to the state—that interest groups and parties 
control”, their greatest strength is being able to channel public expression of frustration 
into demonstrations.
9
 Second, a social movement must have a common identifiable 
purpose behind which actors can unite. Third, social movements can only occur when 
leaders are able to unite disparate actors by creating a collective identity through the use 
of symbols and joint narratives. Finally, this identity then must be mobilized in sustained 
interaction with elites, rather than a one-time burst of frustration, in order to be 
considered a movement.  
 Having identified the features of social movements, the next question becomes 
how this phenomenon emerges. Olson’s theory of collective action raises the question of 
how a social movement can emerge. In The Logic of Collective Action, Olson examines 
how individuals aggregate to form a collective. In particular, he demonstrates that a 
rational individual acting in accordance with his private cost-benefit analysis will not 
account for the true social benefit gained from the provision of public goods. This will 
result in an underprovision of the good. Public goods are non-rival in consumption, in 
that one individual’s enjoyment of the good does not diminish another individual’s 
opportunity to enjoy the good. Additionally, public goods are non-excludable, in that 
once public goods have been provided, any individual in society can enjoy them.  
Applying Olson’s public good theory to the legislative process, it becomes apparent that 
the effects of consumer legislation are non-excludable in that once someone has borne the 
costs of lobbying, others cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of the public 
                                                        
9 Tarrow, Power In Movement, 5 
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policy. Consumer legislation is non-rival in consumption in that the benefit an individual 
gains from utilizing the new public policy does not detract from others’ enjoyment of it. 
Olson concludes that the nature of public goods incentivizes individuals in large groups 
to free ride, or avoid paying the costs of providing for the public good while enjoying its 
benefits after its establishment. If consumer legislation is a type of public good, then 
every consumer hopes to enjoy the benefits of the legislation following its enactment. 
However, each individual is unwilling to provide the funds necessary to fund the lobby 
that would establish the agency. Thus without third-party oversight, Olson predicts that 
individuals will fail to unite to lobby for consumer legislation, a type of public good.   
 In the 1960s, scholars developed grievance theory
10
 to explain the emergence of 
social movements. Although the theory fell out of favor with the academic community in 
the 1980s due to the rise of resource mobilization theory,
11
 some theorists still use its 
basic tenants. There are three principle variations of grievance theory: deprivation theory, 
mass society theory and structural strain theory. Deprivation theorists claim that social 
movements occur when individuals feel deprived of a certain resources and as a result 
mobilize to obtain them (Runciman, 1966; Martin, 1968; Major, 1994). Mass society 
theorists (Kornhauser, 1959; Nisbet, 1969) stress the feeling of empowerment that a 
social movement provides to individuals who feel insignificant within society. Structural 
Strain Theorists (draws on the work of Merton, 1957; Smelsner, 1962; Foster and 
Matheson, 1999) stress the role of a catalyst that gives rise to social discontent and causes 
the masses to rally behind a proposed solution.  
                                                        
10 Grievance theory emerged in Runciman’s 1966 classical study on relative deprivation.   
11 Jacquelien van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans, “Individuals in Movements: A Social 
Psychology of Contention,” In Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines, eds. Bert 
Klandermans and Conny Roggeband (New York: Springer, 1994), 160 
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 Grievance theories are descriptively useful in that they highlight the development 
of mass consciousness key to the emergence of social movements. For example, 
grievance theory helps explain the collective consumer identity that formed in the 
Occupy Wall Street Movement, which was based upon a communal claim that banks 
were gaining at the expense of average citizens. This collective sense of deprivation 
united citizens across the nation. However, the theories face two principle problems. 
First, they succumb to a type of circular logic— the appearance of a social movement is 
indicative of societal discontent and societal discontent leads to a social movement. 
Second, they overlook the free rider problem and cannot explain how the lobby is 
financed or sustained organizationally. Thus, grievance theories identify a necessary but 
not the sufficient conditions for the emergence of a social movement. 
 In response to Olson’s collective action challenge, resource mobilization theory 
claims that social movements emerge when individuals are able to attain sufficient 
resources, such as money, knowledge, or support from political elites, to take action 
(Lipsky, 1968; Eisinger, 1973; McCarhy and Zald, 2001). The theory stresses a level of 
professionalization, in that political entrepreneurs and organizations act as intermediaries, 
transforming societal unrest into an organized movement. From the perspective of 
Olson’s theory, political entrepreneurs and organizations are willing to act as a privileged 
group, supplying the necessary resources to finance the movement and overcome the free 
rider problem.  
  A final theory that attempts to explain the emergence of social movements is the 
political process theory (McAdams, 1982; Meyer, 2004; Eisinger, 1973; Tarrow, 1989). 
This theory draws on insights from grievance theory and resource mobilization theory but 
 15 
stresses a third key element, political opportunity. Like grievance theory, political process 
theory recognizes the necessity of insurgent consciousness— the development of a 
collective sense of deprivation due to a specific political context— that motivates 
individuals to unite.
12
 Like resource mobilization theory, political process theory stresses 
the necessity of organizational strength, which includes access to resources and effective 
leadership often provided by political entrepreneurs. The new component of political 
process theory is that it stresses political opportunities, the degree to which the existing 
societal structure is receptive to change. Four key factors determine the emergence of 
political opportunities: increasing political pluralism, a weakening in repression, support 
of the social movement by political elites, and broadened access to key political 
institutions.
13
 
  
Consumer Movements in Theory and Practice 
 Having defined a social movement and stipulated on the factors that lead to its 
emergence, we can now ask the question: how well does social movement theory apply to 
consumer movements? In many respects, consumer movements seem to be an ideal test 
case for social movement theory. By definition, nearly everyone is a consumer. 
According to Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, a consumer is one that utilizes economic 
goods. According to Investopedia, a consumer is someone who buys goods for personal 
use and not for resale or manufacturing. We all enter the marketplace on a daily basis in 
order to transact with others, buying and selling resources in order to survive. Consumers 
span the nation and have varying interests. Intuitively it seems hard to fathom that these 
                                                        
12 Ryan Cragun and Deborah Cragun et al., Introduction to Sociology, (Seven Treasures Publications, 
2008), 233 
13 Ryan Cragun and Deborah Cragun, Introduction to Sociology, 234 
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geographically and motivationally diverse peoples could come together in a united front. 
What would it mean then to unite consumers into a social movement? Can we find 
historical examples of consumers coming together behind an issue in order to enact 
change in the political system?  
 Examining the historical record, we find that there are numerous instances when 
consumers have united to lobby for special rights and protection in the marketplace. 
Consumer movements, which will be referred to here as consumerism, have emerged in 
waves throughout history. While in the Middle Ages the law of the land was caveat 
emptor, or buyer beware, consumer interest emerged with the dawn of the Industrial 
Revolution, as consumers became inundated with a range of new products that spanned 
the nation.
14
 Overwhelmed by a large variety of new products whose quality and purpose 
was often unknown, consumers united behind the common cause of consumer protection 
in order to lobby against the more concentrated producer or business interests. Reacting 
to an increasingly unsure, technological world, consumers have formed consumer 
movements, peppered throughout the last century, in order to ensure that their needs are 
being met.  
 From a theoretical perspective, a consumer movement possesses the key 
characteristics of a social movement— collective challenge, common purpose, social 
solidarity and sustained interaction with elites. The emergence of consumer movements 
can be explained through any of the previously cited social movement theories— 
grievance theory, resource mobilization theory or political process theory. Robert Mayer 
distills these theories into two schools of thoughts that explain the emergence of 
                                                        
14 Robert N. Mayer, The Consumer Movement: Guardians of the Marketplace, (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1989), 12 
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consumerism— structuralism and political entrepreneurs. Either these movements were 
caused by a set of precise social conditions, in line with political process theory, or by 
political entrepreneurs who are willing to bear the costs of rallying the masses, in line 
with resource mobilization theory.
15
 In some sense, this theoretical divide between 
environmental conditions and the role of a political entrepreneur is a false one. In 
practice, both forces play a role in the emergence of social movements.  
 
A Brief History of the U.S. Consumer Movement 
 Periods of consumerism in the United States have ebbed and flowed during the 
last century, catalyzed by fundamental changes in the marketplace and technological 
advancements that have created uncertainty and fear among the general public.
16
 Broadly 
speaking, there have been the three Eras of consumerism as defined by Robert N. Mayer 
and Stephen Brobeck: in the early 1900s with the Progressives push for humanitarianism 
and efficiency, in the 1930s with the Great Depression and FDR’s New Deal, and in the 
1960s with Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs.17 I will examine briefly each 
period of consumerism, identifying the catalyst as well as key wins and loses for the 
consumer movement. 
 The dawn of the Industrial Revolution marked the First Era of Consumerism. 
Prior to the revolution, laws focused upon ensuring orderly commerce but not upon 
protecting consumers.
18
 The Industrial Revolution marked a societal shift from 
                                                        
15 Mayer, Guardians of the Marketplace, 30-33 
16 Mayer, Guardians of the Marketplace, 10 
17 Ed. Stephen Brobeck, associate Eds. Robert N. Mayer and Robert O. Hermann, Encyclopedia of 
Consumer Movements, (Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO, Inc, 1997) s.v. “U.S. Consumer Movement: History 
and Dynamics,” 584-601 
18 Brobeck et al., Encyclopedia of Consumer Movement, 584 
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unbranded goods produced at home to branded mass-produced goods. With this 
technological boom came the creation of hundreds of new products and brands that could 
be distributed across greater distances, creating a national market for the first time.
19
 To 
the elation of consumers, the Industrial Revolution widened the possible universe of 
consumption. At the same time, however, the new world of shopping could be 
overwhelming, and the average citizen had no way of judging the quality or reliability of 
the goods that he purchased. The increased creation and dissemination of products 
created a new role for the government in regulating the interplay between producers and 
consumers. The government had to regulate the safety and quality of branded goods as 
well as deciding how to ensure a competitive market place through anti-trust laws.
20
 
 The government’s newfound role in regulating product quality can be seen in 
emergent food legislation. In 1906, Upton Sinclair’s, The Jungle, an account of the 
appalling working conditions and practices within the meatpacking industry, sparked 
consumer fury. Consumer advocates began to pressure the president, Theodore 
Roosevelt, to support pure food legislation.
21
 In 1898, local consumer activist groups 
joined forces to form the National Consumers League. The rise of this type of 
organizations at the turn of the 20
th
 century, whether operating on a local or national 
level, transformed individuals’ conceptions of themselves from “workers” or “property 
owners” to “consumers”, who could influence firm behavior through their pattern of 
consumption and united lobbying efforts.
22
  
                                                        
19 Mayer, Guardians of the Marketplace, 12-19 
20 Mayer, Guardians of the Marketplace, 12-19 
21 Brobeck et al., Encyclopedia of Consumer Movement, 586 
22 Brobeck et al., Encyclopedia of Consumer Movement, 586 
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 The second question brought before the government due to the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution was the permissible level of competition within the marketplace.  
Companies joined together in large trusts in order to regulate the quantity and price of 
products that were flooding the market place. The Progressive movement reacted against 
the mounting concentrated power of businesses both in the market and in politics, 
attempting to represent “the people”, a wide range of poorly organized constituents.  In 
1890 the Sherman Antitrust laws were passed, but they were not effectively enforced 
until 1914.
23
 While the Progressives did not stand for consumer interests per se, the 
theme that they raised of the people versus special interests would become the basis of 
future advocacy. The kernel of the movement was present already in the late 19
th
 century 
and can be seen in the passage of the first health and safety regulations as well as efforts 
to foster market competition. However, one could make the case that at this stage in the 
social movement, consumer consciousness had not reached modern form.
24
  
 The Second Era of consumerism began in the 1930s, during the Great Depression. 
The 1920s had been marked by rising income and relatively stable prices, allowing the 
consumer to experience rising real income and an increasingly improved lifestyle. The 
shock of the Depression heightened the previous problem of choice that consumers 
experienced during the Industrial Revolution. Individuals now found themselves 
unemployed, with a reduced income, while shoddy merchandise flooded the market. 
Worsened economic circumstances and increased uncertainty surrounding the quality of 
the product combined to create further support for quality testing among consumers. 
                                                        
23 Mayer, Guardians of the Marketplace, 15-16 
24 Mayer, Guardians of the Marketplace, 12-19 
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Additionally, critiques of advertising emerged during the Second Era, since consumers 
felt that this type of hand waving detracted from well-planned spending. 
25
 
  Consumer sentiment manifested itself in a real way in the second era through the 
formation of the National Recovery Administration in 1933. Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
established this agency as part of the New Deal in order to bring laborers and companies 
together to establish “fair practices” as well as set prices.26 This was the first formal 
representation of consumer interest on the federal level. Furthermore, the Consumer 
Union was established in 1936 to test products and publicize the results in a magazine. 
The research was meant to help consumers shop frugally and effectively. By the 1930s 
businesses had become concerned about the effect of the consumer movement upon 
public attitude. In the 1940s, George Gallup conducted a study, which showed that 20% 
of consumers read and used research reports published by product rating services to 
influence their consumption habits. 
27
 
 Global trade halted during the interwar period, as countries adopted protectionist 
policies and devoted their resources to the war effort. This slowdown in trade on a 
macroeconomic level was paired with a cut in spending on a microeconomic level, and 
the consumer movement came to a standstill. In was not until 1960s that the consumer 
movement was reborn.  The commencement of the Third Era of the movement is often 
associated with John F. Kennedy’s message to Congress in the Spring of 1962. In this 
address, Kennedy enumerated what he termed the Consumer Bill of Rights: the right to 
safety, the right to be informed, the right to chose, and the right to be heard in 
                                                        
25 Brobeck et al., Encyclopedia of Consumer Movement, 587-589 
26 Brobeck et al., Encyclopedia of Consumer Movement, 587 
27 Brobeck et al., Encyclopedia of Consumer Movement, 587-589 
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government-decision making.
28
 These sentiments were solidified under Lyndon 
Johnson’s “Great Society” programs. Johnson created a new White House post, the 
Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs, and appointed Esther Peterson. In 1967, Peterson 
created the Consumer Federation of America, which united state and local consumer 
organizations, consumer cooperative groups, and labor unions to represent consumer 
interest to Congress.
29
 In 1968, Johnson passed a number of consumer bills including the 
truth-in-lending bill, and bills focusing upon consumer safety, fraudulent land sales, and 
hazardous appliance radiation.  
 During the 1970s, Ralph Nader emerged as a leader in consumer advocacy. Nader 
and his “Raiders” chose issues which they had happened upon or had received inside tips 
about, appealed to congressional leaders and then publicized their results in the press or 
through lectures delivered by Nader himself. Nader was most famous for his work on 
automobiles. Since Nader found that government agencies often did not adequately 
support consumer interests, he proposed the creation of the Department of Consumers, a 
bureau to monitor the activities of other government agencies and ensure that they were 
meeting consumer expectations. Although the idea was supported by the Consumer 
Federation of America, the Consumers union and a network of over 100 corporations and 
trade groups, new business interests, who “foresaw an agency with extensive powers and 
the ability to intervene in all aspects of government” were able to block its passage.30   
 One win for the consumer movement was the establishment of the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, an independent agency that regulates the sale and 
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29 Brobeck et al., Encyclopedia of Consumer Movement, 589-593 
30 Brobeck et al., Encyclopedia of Consumer Movement, 593 
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manufacture of over 15,000 products, in 1972. A variety of similar national consumer 
organizations with specialized interests emerged during this time.  
 
Waves of Consumerism Explained: 
Kingdon and Policy Windows 
  
 The success of a consumer movement is a two-step policy process. First, 
consumer issues must be placed upon the policy-making agenda and then these issues 
must be codified in legislation. As noted in the previous historical survey, consumerism 
is parsed into three distinct eras or “waves”. Increased consumer lobbying occurred 
throughout these eras and often resulted in the enactment of a greater amount of 
consumer legislation. In periods where consumer interests did not play a prominent role 
within the public policy space, it thus follows that either consumers did not feel the need 
to lobby for heightened protection or that they were unable to have their interests 
represented on the public policy agenda. The question emerges: how does a particular 
interest find itself upon the public policy agenda? An issue’s consideration for debate is a 
necessary prerequisite to representing a societal interest or protecting it through 
legislation.  
 For Kingdon, a particular policy item rises to the top of the political agenda when 
separate streams of problems, policies and politics come together in a critical moment. In 
order for this union to occur, a policy window must open due to a focusing event, such as 
the emergence of crises or disasters, or through a change in the political stream, such as a 
change in national mood or turnover within the administration or legislature. The opening 
of a policy window creates an opportunity for policy entrepreneurs— advocates who are 
willing to invest time and money to advance a position in return for future ideational or 
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material gain— to couple an apt policy alternative with the problem at hand. An effective 
policy entrepreneur then must couple the problem and its solution to the political stream. 
When these three elements, problem, policy and politics, are joined a new issue is placed 
upon the legislative agenda. 
31
 
 
Determinants of Success in the Consumer Movement 
 
 Even if consumer issues become a matter of public interest, some consumer 
movements have succeeded to advance their interests via legislative change while others 
have not. The literature on determinants of success for a consumer movement is sorely 
lacking, with the notable exception of Robert Mayer. Defining success as the passage of 
consumer legislation that favorably alters the economic welfare of consumers, Mayer 
claims that there are two categories of factors that determine legislative success: 
relatively immutable environmental factors and tactical factors. Environmental factors 
include: public opinion, Congressional support and Presidential support. Tactical factors 
include: choosing the right goals, taking the offensive and skillfully dealing with the 
opposition.  
 For Mayer, environmental factors set the stage for a successful consumer lobby. 
Scandals and dramatic incidents have the power to affect legislative outcomes 
significantly by garnering public support for consumer issues. While Mayer hypothesizes 
that public sentiment has a negligible impact on the passage of legislation in and of itself, 
he notes that it is crucial in influencing elected officials, claiming, “most elected officials 
follow public opinion, a few lead it, and none want to alienate it.”32 Even with public 
opinion resoundingly in favor of consumer issues, Congress and the President are the key 
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players that will form the legislation and enact it. As such Mayer feels that it is necessary 
to have consumer advocates in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. Finally, 
Mayer argues that the President is the “most visible but least important source of 
support.”33 Presidents have indirect power to influence consumer legislation through 
appointments to regulatory agencies.   
 A favorable environment creates an opportunity for consumer legislation to 
succeed, however, a successful consumer movement equally depends upon strong 
political leadership and tactical maneuvering. First, Mayer claims that consumer 
advocates must frame legislative proposals in a manner that can be sold to the public and 
political decision makers. To take the offensive, Mayer stresses that consumerists ought 
to capitalize on events that receive media coverage and properly christen their bills in a 
positive manner. In dealing with the opposition, Mayer stresses turning opponents’ assets 
into liabilities, gaining allies within the business community, and compromising.
34
  
 In line with social movement literature, Mayer stresses the importance of 
environmental factors that converge to create a society is receptive to reform. He then 
stresses the importance of resource mobilization and organization via political 
entrepreneurs. Leading the consumer charge, political entrepreneurs must create a 
comprehensive strategy in order to enact change.  
 
Qualifying Mayer’s Environmental Factors via Pivotal Politics Theory: 
A Note on the Relative Power of Presidential and Congressional Support 
 
 While I broadly accept Mayer’s determinants of legislative success, I believe that 
his theory underemphasizes the importance of political preferences and our separation of 
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powers system in predicting the success of consumer legislation. Keith Krehbiel’s Pivotal 
Politics model is a simple yet elegant account of how the preferences of the President and 
members of Congress create opportunities to pass legislation in some cases and result in 
legislative gridlock in others. The model focuses on identifying key pivot points, 
essentially key players who are able to determine the final policy outcome (Krehbiel, 
1998; Brady and Volden, 1998; Cox and McCubins, 2005).  
 Specifically, pivotal politics theory constructs a model of collective choice along 
a uni-dimensional policy space, on which a continuum of policies ranging from liberal to 
conservative is situated. Players acting within the policy space are the president and 
legislators. Each player has a particular ideal point, a policy under which his utility is 
maximized. The enactment of policies in this theory is not only dependent upon the 
median voter but is additionally dependent upon two supermajoritarian procedures: the 
executive veto and the Senate’s filibuster procedures. The US Constitution grants the 
president the right to veto legislation unless a 2/3 majority overrides his veto. 
Additionally Rule 22 allows for extended debate in the Senate subject to a cloture vote 
that requires a 3/5 majority as of 1975. Among n legislators two may prove to be a pivot 
point due to these supermajoritarian procedures. The pivotal policy theory thus implies 
that in order for policy change to occur, the status quo must lie outside of the gridlock 
interval delineated by the president, Senate filibuster and the House veto override 
member (depending upon which party holds the Presidency and the House).  
 In considering Mayer’s determinants of legislative success, it becomes clear that 
he has missed the interplay between the legislative and executive branch key to the 
American legislative process. Presidential power is not as limited as Mayer suggests 
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since a presidential veto can result in gridlock. Mayer additionally claims that a 
Democratic Congress can be an environmental factor favorable to the passage of 
legislation. While this claim may have proved to be true historically, it is too broad of a 
factor and should be tempered in one key ways. In claiming that a Democratic majority is 
a favorable factor, Mayer assumes homogenous preferences within the party, but 
empirically this is often not the case. If Democratic legislators with more conservative 
preferences prefer the status quo to the proposed legislation, they can form a separate 
coalition and mount a filibuster in order to maintain the status quo.
35
  
 Of course, the pivotal political model also has limitations. First, it tells us nothing 
about why a particular issue is considered by Congress. In other words, the model is 
completely silent on timing. In addition, the parsimony of the model is a strength and a 
weakness. For example, the model doesn’t have anything to say about the role of the 
committee system in the House of Representatives on the legislative process. The 
importance of committees, particularly the Rules Committee in the House will be 
highlighted in the following case studies. The structure of the committee system thus can 
form an additional veto point that the model ignores. Still, the pivotal politics model does 
have explanatory power when combined with some of the other theoretical concepts 
introduced in this thesis.  
 
Frameworks to Analyze the Consumer Movement 
 My case studies in the following section will draw upon the ideas of Mayer and 
Kingdon as well as the theoretical framework of pivotal politics. I hope to show that all 
three have analytical leverage in explaining legislative success and failure in the context 
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of consumer legislation. While alone, none is sufficient to account for legislative 
outcomes in this policy area, taken together, a more holistic picture emerges. In order to 
utilize these different ideas effectively, I have created a simple model that synthesizes 
these three perspectives and describes the process through which consumer legislation 
emerges.    
  
A Model of Consumer Movements: 
What factors determine their emergence and success? 
 
 The evolution from grievance theory to political process theory seems to suggest 
that there are three crucial variables in the emergence of social movements: collective 
grievance that helps foster a communal identity, political opportunity, and 
professionalization of the movement which allows for group resource mobilization. Like 
political process theorists such as McAdam, and Tarrow, John Kingdon stresses the 
importance of an external event that opens a policy window to create a political 
opportunity. It is the emergence of this problem that allows a political entrepreneur to 
couple a specific alternative with the relevant problem and place a given issue upon the 
public policy agenda. Drawing on these insights, I stress that the independent variable in 
my case studies is the emergence of a problem—the reevaluation of failed policy due to 
the manifestation of a crisis. The dependent variable is legislation, which encompasses a 
range of possible outcomes from tough regulation to weak regulation to no regulation at 
all.  
  The process from the recognition of a problem to enactment of legislation is 
conditioned by a variety of intervening variables, for the emergence of the movement 
does not guarantee its success. The initial problem only sets the political stage. 
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Intervening variables then come together to determine the success or failure of consumer 
legislation. One dimension is tactical, where actors interact to produce policy. This is the 
realm within which Kingdon’s political entrepreneur creates and implements a strategy. 
However, actors do not act on a neutral field. The second dimension is the environment. 
To characterize these two dimensions, I draw upon on Mayer’s environmental and 
tactical determinants of legislative success. Mayer’s environmental determinants include: 
public sentiment, the support of the President, and the support of Congress. I add a fourth 
environmental determinant: an ideological shift that occurs in response to the problem or 
crisis that powerfully conditions each of the other three environmental variables. Mayer’s 
tactical determinants of success include: framing legislative proposals so that they can be 
sold to the public and political decision makers, taking the offensive by capitalizing on 
key events that could garner public support through the media, and dealing with powerful 
opponents by turning opponent’s assets into liabilities and gaining allies through 
compromise.  
 A graphical depiction of my relatively simple model can be found on the 
following page.  
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Part III: Case Studies 
 
Introduction and Methodology 
 In the following section I will examine two case studies, the attempted formation 
of a Consumer Protection Agency in the 1960s through the 1970s under the guidance of 
Ralph Nader and the formation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2010 
under Elizabeth Warren. While both Nader and Warren attempted to achieve the same 
goal—the establishment of an independent regulatory body that would represent 
consumer interest on the federal level— the former proved unsuccessful while the latter 
succeeded. The question thus becomes: what factors led to the success of consumer 
lobbyists in present times that were previously lacking?  
 I chose these two case studies because I wanted to examine a specific type of 
consumer legislation that had a similar goal across time. Consumer protection legislation 
is an umbrella category encompassing any statue that seeks to ensure the rights of 
consumers at the expense of producers. There are many types of consumer legislation. 
For example, one type seeks to monitor the quality of products sold to consumers in 
accordance with health and safety standards. Another type seeks to advance the free flow 
of product information throughout the marketplace to stem the probability of fraudulent 
practices and to enhance consumer understanding of the products and services. Consumer 
legislation has often been conflated with the goal of promoting market efficiency. The 
consumer is directly or indirectly protected when the government promotes efficiency in 
markets that the consumer accesses by lowering prices in that market. However, I view 
this as an extension of the consumer protection principle and not consumer protection 
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legislation in and of itself per se. Ralph Nader and Elizabeth Warren’s push for an 
independent agency to represent the consumer interest on a federal level is a particular 
type of consumer legislation that focuses upon the institutional imbalances available to 
consumers and producers. No similar proposal was made in the interim period from 1978 
to 2007.
36
  
 In order to conduct my case study, I draw upon Robert N. Mayer and John W. 
Kingdon’s theoretical insights on the factors key to legislative success as synthesized in 
the model laid out previously. Ultimately, I find the success of the current lobby 
depended upon both environmental and tactical factors, as well as elite preferences in 
Congress and the White House. Broader socio-ideological paradigms reinforced by 
events made certain kinds of tactical framing more or less plausible. In the 1970s, it was 
possible for opponents of consumer protection to frame the initiative as an elitist, anti-
market effort that would stifle economic growth and curtail individual freedom. Against 
the backdrop of a general disappointment regarding the accomplishments of the welfare 
state, anemic economic growth and a general growth in anti-elitist sentiment following 
the struggles over Watergate, the Vietnam War and the counterculture, such charges 
seemed convincing to many. 
  In contrast, following the 2008 global financial crisis, pro-regulation framing 
became more convincing due to repeated market breakdowns, increased resentment of 
                                                        
36 In fact very few consumer protection legislative proposals were made during that period at all. 
While there were some indirect efforts to improve the state of consumers through tax cuts or 
minimum wage laws, these means were enacted in order to stimulate the economy at large. They did 
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1996 in the 104th Congress, Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 in the 105th Congress, Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief Act or the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfield Revitalization Act or the Job 
Creation and Worker Assistance Act in the 107th Congress, or the Fair Minimum Wage Act in the 110th 
Congress . They did not seek to protect the consumer against another concentrated interest.  
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business elites as a result of rising inequality, and a general drawing back from market 
ideology a la Milton Friedman to Alan Greenspan. This societal shift in the basic 
understanding of how the marketplace functions provided the environmental framework 
within which successful consumer lobbying could take place.  
 
A Note on the Definition of Success 
 
 For the purpose of my thesis, I will restrict the range of my dependent variable 
and measure success in terms of whether or not the consumer lobby was able to pass 
consumer legislation. This limitation is supported by the literature on lawmaking in 
Congress, which also measures legislative success by whether a bill passes (Krehbiel, 
1998; Brady and Volden, 1998; Cox and McCubbins, 2005). Passage of a bill into a 
public enactment by definition changes the status quo point of legislation. This means 
that legislation is being moved closer to the preferred position of those favoring the law. I 
realize that this is not a perfect measure of success, and some critics might argue that the 
passage of consumer legislation is not a true measure of success. Rather success depends 
upon the extent to which the enacted legislation is able to produce the desired change 
within society. A watered down version of a consumer protection agency that has no real 
power is simply a symbolic victory.
37
  
  Some scholars have made this argument in reference to the Dodd-Frank Bill. 
John Wooley and Nicholas Ziegler claim that the Dodd-Frank Act caused “significant but 
less than transformational change” in financial regulation due to the compromise between 
                                                        
37 Symbolic victories can be important in and of themselves. Making Martin Luther King Date a 
national holiday was symbolic but very significant. Nonetheless, this is a claim often leveled against 
the CFPB.  
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financial elite and grass-root consumer activists necessary to pass the bill.
38
  Of course, 
this characterization is true of almost all significant legislation. Daniel Carpenter 
similarly claims that the Obama administration’s proposals for a dramatic reform have 
been diluted due to “institutional strangulation,” a process in which existing government 
agencies lobby against the creation of new agencies in order to capture the largest portion 
of available transaction and institution fees. 
39
 These criticisms could be applied to the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, namely that it is a weakened agency born out of 
compromise between consumerists, business lobbyists and current regulators. But, this 
type of critique ignores the reality that the passage of laws depends upon compromise.  
 A further consumerist concern is the ability of the currently Republican-
dominated House of Representatives to weaken the CFPB’s future influence and 
autonomy. While the passage of Dodd-Frank moved the status-quo point in the direction 
of the consumer movement, some consumerists fear that this is not representative of 
society as a whole and will not have an enduring presence. While the Democratic 
majority in the 111
th
 Congress managed to push through the Dodd-Frank and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010, the subsequent Congressional elections saw a shift in the 
composition of the House and Senate, with Republicans securing the House as well as 
winning additional seats in the Senate. This has led some consumerists to worry for the 
future of the CFPB. Even if the consumer lobby was successful in establishing a CFPB, 
can we really consider it a success for the consumer movement if its future powers are to 
be continually challenged and perhaps weakened?  
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 A preliminary attempt to restrict the scope of the CFPB’s powers occurred on 
May 5, 2011,when forty-four Republican Senators led by Richard Shelby made public a 
letter written to Obama stating that they would block any nominee for the Director of the 
CFPB unless the Democrats conceded to altering the agency’s structure and funding.40 In 
particular, the Senators requested that the agency’s director was replaced by a board of 
directors, that its funding was subject to congressional appropriations and that its 
operations would be subject to other bank regulators.
41
 These changes would severely 
limit the autonomy of the CFPB by making it dependent upon the Republican controlled 
House for funding. In July 2011, President Obama used a recess appointment to 
overcome the Republican-led filibuster and name Richard Cordray the first Director of 
the CFPB.  
 With regard to the first critique, I would argue that the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau is not just a symbolic institution with limited powers. Compromises 
were made in order to allow for its formation. Nonetheless, Congress is built upon 
compromise. With regard to the second, I would point out that critics are still accepting 
the initial passage of consumer legislation as a measure of success for the consumer 
movement and are worried about shifting exogenous factors that may alter the status quo 
and result in a weakening of the successful legislation. I would point out that as long as 
the current administration remains committed to consumer protection, consumerists 
should remain cautiously optimistic. The agency has been established and will continue 
to function due to the tri-cameral veto that defines the American political system.  
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 As lawmaking literature notes, the passage of consumer legislation is a 
preliminary but necessary step in order to represent consumer interest. It marks a level of 
governmental acceptance that consumers are a group who ought to be represented and 
protected. While both the legislation and its enforcement could be improved upon in the 
future, just the act of moving the bill through both Chambers as well as obtaining a 
Presidential stamp of appeal is the necessary building block to further consumer interest. 
Thus for the purpose of my study, I will measure a consumer movement’s success based 
upon whether or not consumerists were able to get their proposed legislation passed.  
 
Case I: Pushing for a CPA, But Falling Short 
42
 
 
 During the third era of consumerism beginning in the late 1960s, Ralph Nader—
an iconic political entrepreneur— began to push for an independent regulatory body that 
could represent consumer interest on a federal level. Consumer activists such as Ester 
Peterson, leading members of the Democratic party and liberal-leaning Senators, most 
notably Jacob Javits and Charles Percy, supported the proposal. The CPA faced 
opposition from members of the Old Right, such as Patrick Buchanan, William F. 
Buckley, and James J. Kilpatrick, as well as a range of business groups and regulatory 
bodies that united to form the Consumer Issues Working Group (CIWG).
43
 Key members 
of the CIWG included: the US Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, the 
Grocery Manufactures Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the 
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American Enterprise Institute.
44
 From 1969 until 1978, various proposals for a Consumer 
Protection Agency were drafted and redrafted in Congress, but ultimately the legislation 
failed to pass.  
 An early form of the bill, H.R. 6037, was first brought before Congress by 
Benjamin Rosenthal (D-NY) in 1969. Rosenthal’s proposal formed a cabinet level 
Department of Consumer Affairs that would act in a regulatory and advocacy capacity 
within the Executive Branch. Under this preliminary proposal, Rosenthal consolidated all 
federal consumer functions and placed them within the Department of Consumer Affairs. 
As the leader of the consumer movement, Nader opposed H.R. 6037 and later helped 
Rosenthal reformulate it. Nader felt that Rosenthal’s proposal would face significant 
opposition from existing regulatory bodies that feared that a new CPA would lead to a 
reduction in their powers and budgets. In order to ensure the passage of the legislation, 
Nader suggested that the Consumer Protection Agency fill a purely advocatory role, 
representing the consumer interest on a federal level.
45
 He additionally stressed the 
importance of creating an independent consumer agency, rather than one housed in the 
Executive branch, in order to isolate the agency from economic and political pressures 
that could compromise the agency’s integrity. By late 1969, Rosenthal had revised H.R. 
6037 to reflect these changes.  
 Preliminary debate surrounding the creation of the proposed CPA mainly centered 
upon the structure of the agency, as this initial structure would inform the agency’s scope 
and power. Taking cues from the Nixon Administration, Republicans tended to favor 
housing the CPA within an already established government agency. In his first Consumer 
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Message to Congress, President Nixon stated that he was willing to grant statutory status 
to his Office of Consumer Affairs but claimed that consumer advocacy functions would 
be more appropriately housed within the Department of Justice.
46
  He reported his 
legislation, H.R. 14785, to Congress on November 12, 1969 accordingly.  
 The House version of the bill, H.R. 18214, recommended for floor consideration 
by the Committee on Government Operations in 1970, melded ideas from Rosenthal and 
Nixon’s previous proposals into a comprehensive bill. This new House bill, H.R. 18214, 
proposed the establishment of an Office of Consumer Affairs within the Executive branch 
that could coordinate consumer policy with the President as well as the creation of an 
independent Consumer Protection Agency that would collect and disseminate research on 
consumer products and act as a representative of the consumer interest when litigation 
was pending before regulatory bodies and the courts. Both the Office of Consumer 
Affairs and the CPA would field complaints on faulty products and fraudulent practices. 
H.R. 18214 additionally instituted a fifteen-member Consumer Advisory Council to 
advise the heads of the aforementioned agencies. The House Rules Committee, however, 
did not recommend H.R. 18214 to floor for consideration by a 7 to 7 vote.
 47
 
 The veto by the House Rules Committee is a significant event given that 
organization of the House via its committee system is not considered in any of the 
theoretical frameworks considered in this paper. Nonetheless, it was hugely influential in 
promoting and killing legislation during the early 1970s. Moreover, it was not 
particularly representative of the House as a whole, given that the Rules Committee was 
heavily influenced by Southern Democrats who tended to hold more conservative views 
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more closely in line with the Republican Party. The composition of the Rules Committee 
was not significant for all legislation, but it did matter for consumer-oriented bills that 
sought to reduce the power of businesses vis-à-vis consumers.  
 In the same Congress, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT) sponsored similar 
measures in the Senate in his draft of the bill, S. 4459. This legislation proposed the 
establishment of a Council of Consumer Advisors to represent consumer interest within 
the executive branch as well as an independent Consumer Protection Agency, which 
would conduct and disseminate product research and testify on behalf of the buying 
interest in pending litigation before regulatory agencies as well as court. The bill passed 
through the Senate by a vote of 74-4.
48
  
 During the 92
nd
 Congress, the House reinvigorated its efforts to pass a new 
version of the CPA bill, H.R. 10835, by a 344-14 vote.
49
  H.R. 10835 was adapted from 
the previous Congress’ H.R. 18214 and maintained the same structure but limited the 
substantive powers of the agency. While preliminary debate surround the CPA focused 
upon the structure of the agency, during the second legislative attempt at creating the 
CPA, Congressional members began to consider the powers of the proposed agency.
50
 In 
particular, there were two major House amendments. Rosenthal sought to expand the 
CPA’s investigatory and adjudication powers and Don Fuqua (D-FL), Clarence Brown 
(R-OH) and others denied the CPA legal party status and standing to seek judicial review 
but expanded the bureau’s advocacy right.51 These attempts failed and a weaker version 
of the CPA emerged, one that was not able to intervene in agency adjudications, 
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involving fines, penalties and forfeitures and one that could not use host agency 
subpoenas.
52
  
 A mini filibuster erupted in the Senate, however, and S. 3970 failed to pass 
through Congress. Southern Democrats, in particular Senator Ervin (D-NC) and Senator 
Allen (D-AL), led the charge against the proposed Consumer Protection Agency. 
Couched in free market ideology, the filibuster focused upon the recent over-expansion 
of governmental activities in the US economy. Senator Ervin claimed that “if the bill 
were to be enacted, it [would] shake the free enterprise system and the economic system 
of the United States to its foundations.”53 Leaders of the filibuster pointed to the 
expansion of government activities that had occurred throughout the previous decade that 
already sought to protect the consumer interest. They questioned the validity of the claim 
that the consumer was not adequately represented in the federal government. 
Furthermore, they argued that if the consumer was not adequately represented within the 
current governmental structure, the existing laws should be revised to properly fulfill this 
function instead of increased government intervention in the market. In the words of 
Senator Ervin, “ I would say that if a bureaucracy is not functioning in the public 
interests, as it is ordered to do, the remedy is not piling another bureaucracy on top of 
it.”54 
 In the 93
rd
 Congress, the House considered a revised bill, H.R. 13163, designed to 
constrain the Consumer Protection Agency’s powers. Unlike previous proposals, H.R. 
13163 did not establish two separate consumer agencies. Instead it sought to establish a 
sole independent CPA that would once again conduct research and represent consumers 
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in regulatory proceeding and courts. However, the agency would now be limited to an 
amicus curiae roles in agency proceedings.
55
  An amicus curiae, literally translated as 
“friend of the court”, is a person or organization who is not party to the case but advises 
the court on matters that may affect its interest. While Virgina Knauer, the Director of the 
U.S. Office of Consumer Affairs,
56
 voiced support for the House bill, President Nixon 
implied a veto it if it passed in its current form. 
57
 In the Senate, the Southern Democrat 
led filibuster once again prevented S. 707 from reaching a floor vote. Supporting the 
filibuster were Bennett Johnston (D-LA), Russell Long (D-LA), Robert Dole (R-KS), 
Robert Griffen (R-MI), Peter Dominick (R- CO), Howard Baker, Jr. (R-TN), Hiram Fong 
(R-HI), and Milton Young (R-ND).
58
 
 The 94
th
 Congress finally marked the successful passage of the bill in both 
houses, but the bill later died in a conference committee when President Gerald Ford 
indicated that he would veto the legislation. The first bill brought before the 94
th
 
Congress’ Senate once again failed to pass due to a filibuster. A subsequent rule change 
in the Senate, however, decreased the count necessary to invoke cloture, lowering the 
chance of a successful filibuster.
59
 On March 12, 1975, the Committee on Government 
Operations reported the bill with an 11-1 vote to the Senate.
60
 On May 13, 1975, the 
Senate invoked cloture with a 71 to 27 vote, allowing the Senate to amend and pass S. 
200 by a 61 to 28 margin on May 15, 1975.  The House amended and passed a 
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companion bill, H.R. 7575, on November 6, 1975 with a 208 to 199 vote.
61
  In a letter to 
the Senate Committee on Government Operations, President Ford asked Congress to 
refrain from further action on the Consumer Protection Agency, implying a veto.
62
 The 
margin of victory had been diminishing in the House since the 91
st
 Congress, and the bill 
no longer had the 2/3 House majority needed to override the presidential veto.  
 There once again seemed to be hope for the Consumer Protection Agency in 1977 
when Jimmy Carter entered the White House after having campaigned on a strong 
consumer protection platform. Consumer demonstrations increased under the Carter 
administration. One such campaign was Nader’s nickel campaign, in which consumers to 
mailed a nickel to congressional representatives since that would cover the cost to 
establish the agency for each American. The forty-three thousand coins, however, only 
frustrated representatives who may have already supported the legislation.
63
 Amidst the 
deregulatory attitude of the late 1970s, public support for the agency greatly subsided. On 
February 8, 1978, the bill was defeated for good.    
 Throughout the nine-year consumerist push for an independent federal agency, 
this goal seemed closest to actualization during Carter’s Presidency. While the House of 
Representatives, the Senate, the President and the public each supported the proposal at 
large at various points in time, under Carter, all factors seemed to combine favorably to 
create an environment conducive to the passage of consumer protection legislation. Not 
only did the Democratic Party, the predominant advocate of consumer issues, hold a 
majority in Congress but the President also supported the formation of a federal body to 
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advance consumer protection. Nonetheless, the bill failed definitively in 1978 and was 
not revived until the financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated the profound economic 
instability and devastation that uninformed buying practices could lead to. Why is it that 
a bill that had enough momentum to last through a nine-year battle failed and died out in 
the last quarter of the 20
th
 century, a time that had been rife with increased consumer 
protection under the strong leadership of Ralph Nader? In order to answer this question, I 
will first examine the environment within which the CPA lobby emerged. I will then look 
at the tactics employed both by Nader and the business lobby to assess which side of the 
debate most effectively leveraged the environmental factors to accomplish its goal.  
 
From Keynes to Friedman: An Ideological Shift 
The First Environmental Factor 
 
 Ideological shifts have the ability to profoundly influence legislative outcomes. 
These shifts tend to occur following a crisis or the reevaluation of a failed public policy 
and as such, are tied to the opening of a policy window. An effective political 
entrepreneur or organized interest group capitalizes upon these new ideological norms, 
linking them to a particular policy alternative to garner support for his cause. The push 
for the formation of a consumer protection agency in the 1970s as well in 2008 came at 
key ideological turning points following significant financial unrest. These ideological 
shifts affected every level of society and powerfully influenced all other environmental 
factors in the case studies. They set the stage for potential reform.  
 The drive to create a consumer protection agency came at a critical juncture in the 
development of American policies and thinking about the proper relationship between 
states and markets. In the 1970s, economic policy began to shift from the state 
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interventionist policies that had characterized the middle of the century to neoliberal 
norms that questioned the ability of the state to act as a central planner. This paradigm 
shift can be seen in the move of academic and political consensus from a Keynesian 
perspective to a free market approach embodied by Milton Friedman, Ludwig von Mises, 
and Friedrick von Hayek. Although these scholars had expressed their views for quite 
some time, it was not until global events exposed weaknesses in Keynesian theory that a 
policy revolution occurred. As Milton Friedman expressed in his Nobel Lecture, “brute 
experience proved far more potent than the strongest of political or ideological 
preferences.”64 On a domestic level, the failure of Keynesianism to deal with high levels 
of inflation and unemployment led the economic community to move towards a more 
accommodating model. On an international level, the failure of ISI and the success of the 
East Asian Economic Miracle highlighted the virtues of a liberal trade theory to the 
international community. 
 Born out of the Great Depression, Keynesian theory stressed the importance of 
government spending in order to raise aggregate demand and lift the economy out of 
liquidity traps that caused recessions. Keynesian policy prescriptions, however, were ill 
equipped to address the stagflation— rising inflation without real economic growth— 
that characterized the 1960s and 1970s, since increased government spending would only 
exacerbate skyrocketing inflation. Throughout the 1960s, the Johnson Administration’s 
monetary expansion due to increased military expenditure as well as continued support 
for Great Society Programs increased the budget deficit and significantly raised inflation. 
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From 1967 to 1968, the budget deficit grew from $9.8 billion to $23 billion.
65
 Similarly 
inflation increased from 1.1% in 1962 to 4% in 1968.
66
 At the same time, US economic 
growth stagnated and unemployment grew from 4% in 1970 to over 10% by 1982.  
  In response to the stagflation that characterized the US economy, Milton 
Friedman developed his theory of the Natural Rate of Unemployment. Friedman claimed 
that the economy tended towards a long-term natural rate of unemployment. Government 
spending could only alter this rate temporarily because businesses and consumers 
anticipate its effects through rational expectations. Unemployment would rise back to 
previous levels, and consumption and investment would sink again, but only this time at 
higher price levels. As a result, increased government spending would only cause 
stagflation. Instead of Keynesian “fine-tuning” of the economy, Friedman proposed a 
deregulated market and floating exchange rate, combined with low inflation and lower 
taxes.
67
 Von Mises and Hayek mirrored these deregulatory sentiments in their work, 
which stressed the inability of states to allocate resources as well as the market, since the 
natural forces of demand and supply were the most efficient way of determining price.
68
  
 The shift away from Keynesian ideology to the liberal free market theories 
espoused by Friedman, Mises and Hayek paralleled the international community’s 
movement away from protectionist policies toward a new neoliberal consensus. In the 
1940s, many developing countries guided by the tenants of structuralism and dependency 
theory adopted Import Substitution Industrialization, substituting domestically produced 
goods for manufactured items they had previously imported. By the 1970s, however, ISI 
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had generated significant economic imbalances within developing countries. First, ISI 
contributed to large budget deficits, since the government bore the initial fixed costs of 
creating a manufacturing sector.  ISI also generated a persistent current accounts deficit, 
since countries needed to import the machines needed in factories from industrialized 
countries but then tended to produce exports that were not competitive in the 
international market. These imbalances were exacerbated by these governments’ 
tendency to maintain an overvalued exchange rate, which encouraged their citizens to 
import and caused the global demand for their exports to fall.
69
  
 Three exogenous shocks in the 1970s—an increase in the price of oil, a reduction 
in the terms of trade and higher interest rates on foreign debt—exacerbated these 
structural problems and caused developing countries to borrow heavily on international 
capital markets.
70
 As a result, many countries, especially in Latin America, soon found 
themselves in a debt-trap— forced to borrow to pay ever more interest on their foreign 
debt— compelling them to turn to international lenders of last resort in order for aid. 
 The only countries to successfully employ ISI effectively were the East Asian 
Tigers— Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. The East Asian model of 
development coupled ISI with an export-oriented strategy. The government initially 
adopted protectionist policies, in order to grow infant industries that were likely to be 
profitable in the international market. When the industries had achieved sufficient 
economy of knowledge and scale, the Asian Tigers opened up their economy to foreign 
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exports. 
71
 The failure of ISI threw the state’s ability to act as a central planner into 
question, while the success of the East Asian Model reinforced previous liberal norms 
regarding the benefits of free trade. By the 1980s, the World Bank had come to promote, 
what John Williamson would later dub, “The Washington Consensus”, a set of neoliberal 
norms stressing open borders, floating exchange rates and deregulated markets.
72
  
 The shift from a Keynesian perspective to a deregulatory stance, as espoused by 
scholars in The Chicago School and globally, would result in the formation of an 
unfavorable environment for the creation of an independent Consumer Protection 
Agency. This socio-ideological paradigm shift first influenced Presidential views and 
later permeated public sentiment, turning first the politicians and policy makers and then 
the public against the proposal for yet another governmental agency tasked with 
regulating the market. The shift in economic norms that occurred in the 1970s thus 
negatively affected the chances of the CPA enactment. It was, however, not the sole 
factor in this legislative outcome. Next, we must examine the Congressional composition 
as well as Presidential support for the legislation to understand how all these factors 
cohered in order to form an environment within which political entrepreneurs lobbied.  
 
Congressional Composition in the CPA Formation 
Mayer’s First Environmental Factor 
 
 While an ideological shift sets the stage for successful consumer legislation on a 
macro scale, a micro-level determinant of a bill’s success is the composition of the House 
                                                        
71 Oatley, International Political Economy, Chapter 7. See also Stephen Haggard “Pathways from the 
Periphery, Hong Kong and Singapore”. It should be noted that these regions followed a somewhat 
different path of development that more closely approximated a free market approach.  
72 John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform” in Latin American Readjustment: 
How Much Has Happened, Ed. John Williamson (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 
1989) 
 47 
and Senate. Since the bill can only be enacted into law with a majority of both chambers, 
bicameral compositions can predetermine its viability. As Mayer notes, consumer 
protection generally has been a cause championed by the Democratic Party.
73
 From 1969 
until 1979, the Democrats held a majority in the House and Senate. From this cursory 
analysis, it would seem that the stage was set for successful consumer legislation to be 
passed.  
 Democrats held a majority in both chambers of the 91
st
 Congress (1969-1971) 
with 57 members in the Senate and 243 members in the House of Representatives 
compared to the Republican’s 43 and 192 members respectively.  In the 92nd Congress 
(1971-1973), the Senate was composed of 54 Democrats, 44 Republicans, 1 Conservative 
and 1 Independent and the House of Representatives had 255 Democrats and 180 
Republicans. The 93
rd
 Congress (1973-1975) was composed of 56 Democrats, 42 
Republicans, 1 Conservative and the House of Representatives had 241 Democrats and 
192 Republicans. The Senate in the 94
th
 Congress (1975-1977) was composed of 60 
Democrats, 37 Republicans, 1 Independent and 1 Conservative while the House of 
Representatives had 291 Democrats and 144 Republicans. Finally the Senate of the 95
th
 
Congress (1977-1979) was composed of 61 Democrats, 39 Republicans while the House 
of Representatives sported 292 Democrats and 143 Republicans.  
 
 House 
Democrats 
House 
Republicans 
Senate 
Democrats 
Senate 
Republicans 
1969-1971 243 192 57 43 
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1971-1973 255 180 54 44 
1973-1975 241 192 56 42 
1975-1977 291 144 60 37 
1977-1979 292 143 61 39 
 
 Mayer’s assumption that a Democratic majority is a favorable environmental 
factor for furthering consumer interests, however, depends upon the assumption that 
policy preferences within the party are homogenous. This assumption holds for adherents 
to the responsible party theory of government who neatly divide parties in clearly 
differentiated and internally cohesive platforms.
74
 However, the continual misalignment 
between this normative theory and the empirical reality has given rise to the weaker 
theory of coalitional party government.
75
 Coalitional party government examines the 
individual preferences of party members. This theory tends to assume that party members 
have distinct preferences across parties and homogenous preferences within it allowing 
for the elimination of gridlock.
76
 However, one does not have to assume that individuals 
have homogenous preferences within parties. Empirically, preferences within a party are 
often heterogeneous. In the case that some more extreme members have preferences that 
differ from the majority view of the party, a pivot point can be created and gridlock often 
occurs.  
 Throughout the consumerist lobby for a CPA in the 1970s, Southern Democrats 
functioned as a pivot point. From the 89
th
 to the 95
th
 Congress, when Civil Rights and 
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Great Society Programs characterized the Democratic agenda, Southern Democrats 
became increasingly disloyal to the party.
77
 Southern Democratic preferences tended to 
more closely mirror Republican preferences more than those of their own party. In the 
case of consumer protection, Southern Democrats emulated a Republican abhorrence of 
government intervention in business and the economy. As a result, throughout the push 
for a CPA, Senator Erwin and Senator Allen mounted a successful filibuster through 
three Congresses blocking the successful enactment of consumer legislation.   
 
Presidential Support in CPA formation: 
Mayer’s Second Environmental Factor  
 
  Although the passage of consumer legislation is contingent upon Congressional 
composition, this environmental factor alone cannot be decisive since proposals are also 
contingent upon executive approval. As such, the final key environmental determinant 
becomes Presidential support for the proposed legislation. The American system of 
governance is based upon checks and balances between the legislative and executive 
branch. Legislation is not only subject to a bicameral veto within both chambers of 
Congress but also can be checked by the executive through a presidential veto. Congress 
is able to override the Presidential veto with a 2/3 majority in both houses. This provision 
seeks to limit the power exercised by the executive. Nonetheless, the barriers to passing a 
bill are clearly much lower assuming presidential support.  
 Throughout the consumerist push for a CPA, 1969-1978, three presidents took 
office, each with varying proclivities regarding the issue of consumer protection.  While 
Nixon, Ford and Carter all supported consumer protection on a basic level, structural and 
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ideological factors hindered the passage of legislation. From a structural perspective, the 
lack of progress on consumer legislation can be attributed to the divided government that 
characterized the presidencies of Nixon and Ford. Republican Presidents and Democratic 
Congresses or vice-versa tend to adopt opposing views on policy issues. However, a 
structural account cannot explain why under Carter, in a truly unified government, 
consumer legislation failed to pass. In order to arrive at a complete account of the 
consumer lobby for a CPA, one must combine a structural explanation with an 
ideological one. The paradigm shift that occurred in the 1970s from a Keynesian to free 
market perspective first influenced Republican Presidents by enhancing their proclivity to 
deregulated free market norms. Both Nixon and Ford framed their refusal to create an 
independent CPA in the terms of a deregulatory thesis. While this shift in sentiment may 
have been limited to the elite level in the early 1970s, by the end of the decade 
deregulatory sentiment had permeated the public realm. To the consumerists’ chagrin, by 
Carter’s Presidency the public no longer as strongly supported legislation to create an 
independent CPA. Without the added push from public opinion, Congressmen no longer 
felt incentivized to vote in favor of consumer legislation. 
 
Deregulation Under Nixon 
 The deregulatory push for a free market began in a limited capacity under Richard 
Nixon. During his presidency, free market sentiment could be seen in a number of 
proposals. For example, S. 2842 sought to deregulate the railroad and trucking sector. 
This effort was expanded upon under Ford who passed the Railroad Revitalization and 
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 and Carter who passed the Airline Deregulation Act 
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(1978). These anti-monopolistic acts sought to reduce barriers to entry within the 
transportation industry and allow for competitive pricing, thereby widening consumer 
access. As the early 1970s only marked the beginning of a larger deregulatory trend, 
some of Nixon’s policies remained staunchly Keynesian, most notably the 
implementation of wage and price controls in 1971. Nonetheless, deregulatory sentiment 
informed Nixon’s consumer protection policies. While Nixon supported consumer 
protection as an abstract ideal, his reluctance to form an independent federal Consumer 
Protection Agency was guided by free market tenants.  
 Nixon’s devotion to consumer protection can be seen in his special message to 
Congress on Consumer Protection. In his address, Nixon expanded upon Kennedy’s 
“Buyer’s Bill of Rights”, asserting that buyers have the right to make intelligent and 
informed decisions between goods and services, the right to have health and safety 
standards ensured by the provider of those goods and services, and the right to express 
dissatisfaction with the quality of the purchased item.
78
 In order to see these rights met, 
Nixon proposed the creation of a new Office of Consumer Affairs in the executive branch 
“with new legislative standing, an expanded budget and greater responsibilities.”79 This 
office would appoint as a director the President Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs, 
who would establish consumer priorities, resolve conflicts among federal agencies 
regarding consumer issues, and research and recommend improvements to government 
programs that seek to advance consumer interest. Additionally, Nixon proposed the 
establishment of a new Consumer Division within the Justice Department, staffed with 
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economists and lawyers and headed by the U.S. Attorney General, to promote the 
consumer interest in judicial proceedings and government councils. 
80
 
  Despite his commitment to consumer protection, Nixon rejected the unnecessary 
expansion of government, insisting that “effective representation of the consumer does 
not require the creation of a new Federal department or independent agency.” Rather than 
increase the size and power of the federal government, Nixon argued that the 
“appropriate arm of Government be given the tools to do an effective job.”81 When 
Congress continued to push for an independent consumer agency, Nixon preemptively 
struck by housing a consumer protection function within the executive branch.  On 
February 24, 1971, after the first Consumer Financial Protection Act passed easily in the 
senate, Nixon issued executive order number 11583, which established the Office of 
Consumer Affairs within the executive office.
82
 This office would coordinate and review 
federal consumer protection policies, advise Federal agency on consumer policies, carry 
out investigations, and report to the President regarding the effect of federal programs 
upon consumers. The creation of the Office of Consumer Affairs can be seen as the 
Nixon Administration’s attempt to reaffirm its support for the consumer cause without 
ratifying the Congressional proposal for an independent agency, which ran contrary to its 
attempt to keep “big government” in check.    
 
Deregulation under Ford 
 While Nixon’s presidential term had only marked the beginning of deregulation in 
the United States, during his Presidency, Gerald Ford and his advisors – including Alan 
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Greenspan, then Chairman of the Board of economic advisors— cemented anti-
Keynesian sentiment into a full-fledged regulatory reform program. This program was 
motivated both by economic and ideational factors. The mid-1970s were characterized by 
recession as well as inflation. Government spending, which expanded under Lyndon 
Johnson, had outpaced economic growth and the government had become dependent 
upon borrowing to sustain the economy. Milton Friedman’s prediction of the 
ineffectiveness of Keynesian interventionism seemed to have been proved true.  
 When Ford assumed the Presidency in 1974, unemployment was at an all time 
high and steadily rising. In August of 1974, unemployment stood at 5.4%, a 0.1% 
increase from the previous month. The economy was slowing, as demonstrated by the 
Dow Jones recorded a record loss, falling nearly 99 points in August. Furthermore, the 
U.S. trade deficit was at an all-time high of 1.1 billion dollars.
83
 Although Democratic 
Congressmen pressured President Ford to apply Keynesian spending measures in order to 
stem unemployment, he refused to do so, claiming the federal spending would only 
increase the budget deficit, lead to higher inflation, and crowd out investment from the 
private sector thereby stifling real growth. Keynesian doctrine was ill suited to address 
the stagflation that characterized the 1970s. Instead, the Ford Administration sought to 
increase consumption and stimulate the economy through a tax cut paired with a 
spending cut.  
 Upon entering office, Ford promised to curtail “big government.”84 His reasons 
for doing this were twofold. First, he felt that the growing federal bureaucracy increased 
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costs that were passed on to the consumer, ultimately leading to inflation.  In one speech 
Ford estimated that administrative costs of the federal bureaucracy resulted in up to an 
additional $2,000 in taxes for each consumer.
85
 Second, Ford subscribed to free market 
ideology that had become popular in the 1970s, claiming that overregulation hindered 
competition and productivity necessary for a healthy society. In his memoirs, Ford 
reflected upon the difficulties caused by the red tape of overregulation. For example, one 
company had to fill out forty-five pounds of Federal Communications Commission 
paperwork in order to simply renew licenses for three television stations.
86
 Ford argued 
that smaller companies in particular were unequipped to deal with the regulatory 
bureaucracy that characterized the current government and found themselves driven out 
of business, decreasing competition, which is “key to productivity and innovation.”87 As 
such, Ford promised to continue to use his veto power “to stem the escalation of Federal 
programs and agencies.”88 
 Congressional support for an independent consumer protection agency thus came 
at the exact moment when the President was attempting to reduce the size of the federal 
bureaucracy. In his letter to the Congressional Committee on Consumer Protection, Ford 
claimed that he “recognized the legitimate public and Congressional concerns be more 
responsive to the interests of consumers.”89 However, he believed that the government 
should improve consumer protection through regulatory reform. Ford did not support the 
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creation of yet another independent agency, which would raise the administrative costs of 
the government at the expense of the private sector. For, it was his firm “conviction that 
the best way to protect the consumer is to improve the existing institutions of 
Government, not to add more Government.”90 Accordingly, he asked the Congress 
postpone further action on the creation of a Consumer Agency, marking the end of a 
consumerist lobby throughout his presidency.  
 
Deregulation Under Carter 
 Unlike Nixon or Ford, President Carter supported the establishment of an 
independent body that would advocate for consumer interests. In a message to Congress 
on April 6, 1977, Carter made clear that he supported the creation of an Agency for 
Consumer Advocacy.
91
 In line with Nader’s original proposal, the agency would not 
perform a regulatory role but rather it would “improve the way rules, regulations and 
decisions are made and carried out.”92 Unlike Ford, Carter claimed that the establishment 
of this agency would in fact help curb inflation since the ACA could supervise 
government actions which raise costs for consumers. Upon the enactment of the ACA, all 
consumer protection functions that were currently within the executive branch would be 
grouped within this new agency. The ACA would have the power to represent the 
consumer in proceedings before federal agencies and would be able to gather information 
independently.  
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 While presidential support had shifted in favor of the establishment of a consumer 
agency, public sentiment had shifted resoundingly against it. Public sentiment had turned 
against government regulation of the economy and moved in favor of a free market 
economy, as can be seen from the Harris Survey and the Shell Oil Survey below. 
Additionally public sentiment had shifted regarding the level of government regulation of 
consumer products. As one can see from Gallup’s survey, in 1970 a majority of 
individuals surveyed wanted more regulation. By 1977, however, the number of 
individuals surveyed favoring more government regulation of consumer products had 
fallen to 38%.  The shift in support for a consumer protection agency was less drastic. 
However, couched in the general deregulatory sentiment of the late 1970s, it had an 
impact. As can be seen from a 1977 Roper survey, the percent of individuals surveyed 
that thought it was a good idea to institute a federal Consumer Protection Agency fell 
from 55% in 1974 to 50% in 1977. Congress no longer felt pressured by public sentiment 
to establish a Consumer Protection Agency.  In June of 1977, Senate Majority Leader 
Robert Byrd announced that the bill would not be called for debate in the Senate. It also 
seemed that the bill would not pass in the House.
93
 Marjorie Boyd in Washington 
Monthly cited the public’s lack of interest in consumer legislation as key to 
Congressmen’s shift away from supporting a Consumer Protection Agency. 94 
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Harris Survey, Feb, 1978
95
 
 
Do you agree with the statement that a consumer protection agency will prevent 
businesses from doing their job by increasing the level of red tape?  
 
Agree 48% 
Disagree 34% 
Not Sure 18% 
 
Shell Oil Company Survey, “Public & Worker Attitudes Toward Carcinogens & 
Cancer Risk Survey”, Apr, 1978 
 
Which general position would you say you lean toward--the free competition or the 
government watchdog role idea? 
 
Free Competition Idea 45% 
Watch Dog Role 22% 
Combination of Both 28% 
Don’t know 5% 
 
GALLUP 
 
In your opinion, should there be more government regulation of consumer products and 
how they are sold, or less regulation than there is now? 
 
 1970 1977 1981 
More Regulation 55% 38% 43% 
Less Regulation 14% 30% 37% 
Same as now 17% 17% 5% 
Don’t Know 14% 14% 12% 
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ROPER 
 
What do you think-that all things considered, the creation of a Federal Consumer 
Protection Agency is a good idea or not a good idea?  
 
 May 1974 May 1975 June 1977 
Good idea 55% 48% 50% 
Not a good idea 29% 31% 29% 
Good in some ways, not others 10% 11% 13% 
Don’t Know 6% 10% 8% 
 
 
 
Setting the Stage:  
Summary of Environmental Factors in the 1969-1978 CPA Formation 
 
 The early 1970s marked an era of ideological change, a shift in thought among 
elites who set the public policy agenda and the public alike. The 1960s had been a decade 
committed to advancing consumer interest on a federal level. Consumer scholars often 
date the beginning of the third era of the consumer movement to John F. Kennedy’s 
Consumer Message to the Congress in 1962 in which he formulated his famous 
Consumer Bill of Rights. Consumer interests were institutionalized on a federal level 
under Lyndon Johnson who created a White House post of Special Assistant for 
Consumer Affairs. In 1968, Johnson called for the passage of numerous consumer bills 
such as the truth in lending bill, new legislation regarding the inspection of poultry, 
fraudulent land sales and hazardous appliance radiation.
96
 Furthermore, the 1960s were 
the decade of Nader’s “Raiders” who created a new lobbying approach to incite public 
sentiment and pressure Congress through the investigation of key industries and 
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publishing of their findings in the media. To some extent consumerism carried over into 
the early 1970s. In 1972, Congress created the Consumer Product Safety Commission, an 
independent agency that monitors the sale and manufacture of thousands of products.
97
 
The shift in economic thought from Keynes to Friedman that occurred in the 1970s, 
however, hindered the possibility of meaningful consumer protection via government 
intervention in the market.  
 This ideological shift directly influenced two of Mayer’s environmental 
determinants of success—presidential and public support. In the case of the CPA 
formation in the 1970s, the ideological shift that shaped the policy agenda seemed to 
occur first on an elite level amongst academics and bureaucrats and slowly trickled down 
to the public level by the Carter administration. The decisive factor for consumer 
legislation in the early years was Presidential support, which was resoundingly against 
the proposition under Nixon and Ford. Once these new economic norms had permeated 
the public at large, they proved a decisive blow to the consumer lobby’s goal of 
establishing an independent agency. Public support remained strong in the early 1970s 
during the Nixon Administration and began to turn during the Ford Administration, as 
can be seen from the polling data. The lack of public support for a CPA under Carter 
finally resulted in the death of the legislation.  
 A second environmental variable crucial in defining the environment was the 
heterogeneous preferences in the Democratic Party. Southern Democrats divided the 
party that traditionally supported consumer issues. This undermined the Democratic 
majority in the Congress and stalled consumer legislation in both the House and the 
Senate.  
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Tactical Factors in CPA Formation 
 While environmental factors set the stage for possible reform, the lobbying efforts 
within this larger context define the success of legislative proposals. Environmental 
factors can open what John Kingdon dubs a policy window, a critical moment in which 
policy entrepreneurs are able to couple their agenda with a particular issue due to the 
appearance of problems, changes in the national mood, administrative turnover or interest 
group pressure.
98
 However, the strategy employed by interest groups and political 
entrepreneurs dictates whether or not this group will be successful in achieving their goal. 
As laid out in the beginning of this section, Mayer identifies three key tactical 
determinants of success: the framing of legislative proposals, capitalizing on key events 
that could garner public support through the media, turning opponent’s assets into 
liabilities, and gaining allies through compromise.
99
 
 Unfortunately for the consumerists, the business lobby proved to be decidedly 
more effective in its tactics than the consumer lobby in the 1970s. The rise of 
deregulatory sentiment in the 1970s created a framing opportunity for the business and 
anti-consumerist lobby. Through new rhetorical devices the business lobby was able to 
successfully turn consumerists’ assets into liabilities, depicting federal consumer 
advocates as elitist. The business lobby then disseminated this new view of the consumer 
proposals throughout newspapers in attempt to turn public sentiment against the 
legislative proposal. Conversely, the consumer lobby, led by the political entrepreneur 
Ralph Nader, strove to achieve an idealistic goal and refused to compromise, often 
isolating members of Congress and former allies in the process.  
                                                        
98 See John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd Ed. (Pearson, 2010) 
99 Mayer, Guardians of the Marketplace, 92 
 61 
 
A Tactical Manipulation of Deregulatory Sentiment: 
The rise of Neoconservative Rhetoric 
 
 The rise of deregulatory sentiment in the 1970s created a framing opportunity for 
anti-CPA lobbyists. Public opinion influences Congressional voting behavior, particularly 
in election years. Thus as Mayer noted, a bill’s success partially depends upon framing 
proposals in a manner that appeals to the public and politicians. The consumer movement 
had always been based upon giving voice to the average person in the face of large 
corporate interests. But in the 1970s, anti-CPA forces channeled the deregulatory attitude 
of the decade in order to depict pro-CPA lobbyists as elitists pushing for an overly 
powerful, inefficient bureaucratic agency. This new neoconservative framing, supported 
by the paradigm shift from Keynesian to free market norms, proved a decisive blow to 
the Consumer Protection Agency in the Ford and Carter administration. 
 Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, polls consistently indicated strong support 
for consumer protection and an independent federal agency.
100
 Nader was viewed as a 
national hero as was evident in polls from that era.
101
 Established consumer protection 
agencies grew in powers, with the Consumer Union doubling in size between 1966 and 
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1972.
102
 By the late 1970s, however, public sentiment had become increasingly opposed 
to consumer issues. In 1978, Marjorie Boyd reported in the Washington Monthly: 
“Many congressmen who previously supported the idea of a 
Consumer Protection Agency were surprised earlier this 
year to find opposition to the bill growing among their 
constituents. Congressmen are increasingly hearing from 
advisers and friends who serve as political barometers in 
their districts that people are not so keen on consumer 
legislation as they once were.”103  
 
How is it that in a few years, public sentiment had shifted so dramatically from a pro to 
anti consumer stance?  
 In his work, Buying Power: A History of Consumer Activism in America, 
Lawrence Glickman claims that this shift in public opinion was due to the effective use of 
neoconservative rhetoric created by the business lobby. While I agree that this 
neoconservative rhetoric was a tactic engineered by the business lobby to defeat the CPA, 
I would like to expand upon Mayer’s thesis and claim that the emergence of this rhetoric 
was a function of the ideological changes occurring within that decade.  New 
conservative rhetoric drew on the lessons of deregulatory norms that were coming into 
favor in the mid to late 1970s. Turning away from Keynesian government intervention, it 
mirrored the neoliberal norms of an efficient free market within which rational 
individuals, acting in their own self-interest, advance the market towards a social 
equilibrium. 
 When analyzing the discourse employed by anti-CPA lobbyists, we can see hints 
of an efficient market hypothesis emerging. An efficient market hypothesis claims that 
government regulation through additional bureaucratic agencies will inhibit a well-
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functioning economy. A principle complaint leveled against the establishment of the CPA 
was that it would increase the “bureaucracy.” The term bureaucracy became synonymous 
with “big government.” Similarly, critics claimed that the CPA would result in “red tape 
and lawyers” at the expense of smaller businesses which would be ill suited to file the 
additional paperwork.
104
 In their campaign against the CPA, the American Enterprise 
Institute claimed that the agency would “harass business in its unreasonable single-
minded pursuit of the consumer interest” and that “exuberant consumerists would 
terrorize American industry.”105 In the neoconservative rhetoric of the 1970s, thus, the 
CPA came to represent government overreach and interference in the market at the 
expense of a well-functioning economy.  
 The rise of neoconservative rhetoric marks the anti-CPA lobby’s successful 
implementation of two tactics: capitalizing on a key event and framing of its proposal in 
terms that could be sold to the public through the media. First and foremost, the anti-CPA 
lobby capitalized on the shift in deregulatory sentiment that took hold in the 1970s. It 
then used this ideological shift to reframe the CPA debate in a way that would garner 
public support for its side. Having rebranded the CPA’s vision, the anti-CPA lobby then 
disseminated these views nationally via the media. The anti-CPA lobby created a 
narrative that was then picked up by op-eds, in the Wall Street Journal, the Nation’s 
Business, the Dallas Morningstar News, the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times 
among others.
106
  
  The anti-CPA lobby’s last successful tactic was its rebranding of the consumer 
message to turn it into a liability. Anti-CPA lobbyist portrayed pro-CPA lobbyists’ bid to 
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represent consumer interest on a federal level as an assumption of incompetence of the 
average citizen. Ronald Reagan argued that the CPA was “promoting the notion that 
people are too dumb to buy a box of corn flakes without being cheated. The professional 
consumerists are, in reality, elitists who think they know better than you do what’s good 
for you.”107 Using the framing opportunity presented by the environmental shift to 
deregulatory sentiment, the anti-CPA lobby thus effectively turned their enemy’s strength 
into a liability. The CPA had previously portrayed their quest to represent the consumer 
on a federal level as an attempt to stand up for the “little guy”, an attempt to give a voice 
to those that otherwise would not be heard. Their goal was to empower a diverse and 
relatively powerless interest group through representation in government. The business 
lobby took this rallying call of the CPA lobby, its strength in terms of gaining public 
support, and reframed it as a power ploy by left-wing elites.  
 
Tactical Errors in Political Entrepreneurship: The Case of Ralph Nader 
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Ralph Nader spearheaded the consumerist 
movement, aggressively advocating for consumer interests through investigatory reports, 
a strong media presence, and lectures, as well as lobbying on a federal level.  Nader had 
always held true to his beliefs, refusing to yield to authority or compromise on what he 
felt were abhorrent corporate and governmental injustices. The son of Lebanese 
immigrants, he had always been encouraged to stay strong to his views and not accept the 
status quo. In an anecdote Nader was fond of recounting, his father once asked him after 
returning from school, “Well, Ralph, what did you learn in school today? Did you learn 
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how to believe, or did you learn how to think?”108 This was a philosophy that Nader 
would carry with him for the rest of his life, refusing to toe the line or defer to authority. 
Nader’s unyielding persistence and refusal to compromise on his ideals contributed to the 
passage of an abundance of consumer protection measures in the 1960s, such as the 
National Auto and highway Traffic Safety Act, the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking 
Water Act as well as the establishment of a wealth of federal regulatory agencies such as 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Consumer Product Safety Administration. In the 1970s, however, the 
same tactics that had been effective in the previous decade began to be seen as “tired” or 
“overly-aggressive.” In particular, Nader’s blatant public humiliation of former 
employees and previous allies alienated him from colleagues in the executive branch.
109
  
  In part, the particularly aggressive tactics that characterized his strategy in the 
1970s could be attributed to Nader’s feeling of betrayal by the Carter administration. 
After having met only once with either of the previous two Republic Presidents, Nader 
was extremely optimistic about what a Democratic President and Congress could 
accomplish regarding consumer protection.
110
 Nader had met with Carter before the 
election at his home in Georgia and had felt that Carter had committed strongly to the 
consumer agenda. Upon entering office, however, Carter exhibited more moderate 
tendencies, attempting to placate both Republicans and Democrats. While Carter 
appointed a number of Naderites to his cabinet, Nader complained that most of the 
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appointments were not at the senior level. Furthermore, Nader questioned the speed at 
which Carter was proposing legislation, stressing that there was only a “three month 
grace period” to get things done.111 
  Nader’s frustration with President Carter was expressed in his appearance on 
SNL on January 15, 1977. In one skit, Nader played himself and Aykroyd played 
President Carter, dressed in full confederate regalia and with a deep Southern drawl. The 
contrast was supposed to be drawn between the quick-witted Nader who was questioning 
the President on the consumer agenda while the President came across as a country 
bumpkin.
112
 This frustration only aggravated Nader’s already aggressive tendencies and 
may have played a role in his subsequent defeats.  
 The first sign that Nader “didn’t play well with others”113 came about when he 
publically criticized Joan Claybrook, a former employee of his who had been appointed 
to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration part of the Department of 
Transportation. On November 30, 1977, Nader sent an eleven page long letter to the 
media criticizing not only Claybrook’s stance on airbags but her personal “nerve” as well. 
Nader did not even send a copy to Claybrook in advance, a failure which she and others 
viewed as a lack of common courtesy. For many Naderites, this marked the first time that 
they witnessed the more cutting side of Nader. Remarking on the incident later Crawford 
remarked that the actions,“[were] also personal. A lot of people have said, well you 
shouldn’t attack your former staff. They thought it was really lousy for [Nader] to do 
that.”114 Nader additionally publically called Harrison Well in the OMB a “box shuffler.” 
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In publically criticizing his former friends and allies, Nader began to inadvertently 
destroy his chance at meaningful reform. The Carter Administration marked the first time 
that there had been a Democratic President, Democratic Congress, and a substantial 
amount of Naderites in the President’s Cabinet. A window of opportunity had presented 
itself but whether due to his idealism or egoism, Nader decided to employ tactics that 
eroded support for the consumer cause in the White House. 
  Nader’s idealism and unwillingness to compromise also hindered the passage of 
the Consumer Protection Agency Act, which in Nader’s words marked “the most 
important piece of consumer legislation to ever come before Congress.”115 Nader first 
exhibited his unwillingness to compromise in 1970, when the bill passed through the 
Senate 74-4 but with what Nader viewed as “intolerable erosions”. Nader had worked 
closely with Senator Ribicoff to introduce the bill. Upon the bill’s passage, however, 
Nader vehemently chastised Ribicoff in the newspapers for diluting the purity of the 
concept.
116
 This condemnation of a former ally led to the bill failing to procure Senatorial 
cooperation, and the bill died in committee soon after this incident. 
  Throughout the 1970s, the bill had several more opportunities to pass through 
Congress with specific amendments, such as limiting the CPA to cases that did not 
involve fines or penalties or excising interrogatory powers. Nader, however, refused to 
water down the bill for the sake of passing the legislation. During the Carter 
Administration, Nader began to campaign for the CPA with renewed vigor. In line with 
his offensive tactics characteristic of this decade, he went to the hometown of every 
senator and representative that did not support the legislation and derided them in the 
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local newspapers and media. For example, Nader called Patricia Schroeder (D-Col), a 
representative who was not satisfied with certain parts of the bill, a “mushy liberal” in the 
Denver Post. 
117
 
 The bill lost definitively in 1978 by a vote of 227 to 189. No fewer than101 full 
democrats voted against the bill. Among them, 49 freshman Dems, 25 voted for and 24 
against.
118
 Although Democrats historically had voted for consumer protection 
legislation, Nader’s tactics had alienated many supporters. One democrat, upon casting 
his “nay”, allegedly whispered “this one’s for you, Ralph”.119 Similarly in an interview 
with the Washington Post, Tip O’Neil (D-MA) stated, “I know about 8 guys who would 
have voted with us if it were not for Nader.”120 
 Ralph Nader’s strong commitment to the consumer cause thus manifested itself in 
an unsuccessful tactic. According to Mayer, one critical determinant to passing consumer 
legislation is willingness to compromise. While Nader’s strong commitment was 
something that many had admired in the past, in the 1970s his unwillingness to temper 
his views and understand that governmental employees had multiple constraints acting 
upon them resulted in “tactics [that] began to grate on nerves.”121 By publically chastising 
Congressmen and bureaucrats, Nader turned friends into foes and lost public support. He 
was no longer an effective political entrepreneur championing the consumer cause.  
 
Tying it all together:  
Environmental and Tactical determinants of the CPA’s legislative failure 
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 From 1969-1978, environmental and tactical factors combined to create a moment 
that was not conducive to the passage of consumer legislation. While a cursory glance at 
the case would seem to suggest that all the key environmental factors were in line for 
successful consumer reform— a Democratic Congress, Presidents who were supportive 
of consumer protection, and mounting public opinion that had been in favor of consumer 
protection throughout the 1960s— a closer examination of these factors yields different 
results.  
 First, the broader ideological shift from Keynes to Friedman at the turn of the 
1970s created an opportunity for the anti-consumerist lobby to couple their agenda of 
maintaining the status quo with deregulatory norms that were increasingly coming into 
fashion. This sentiment initially influenced the decisions of public policy elites and 
eventually permeated public opinion at large. While Republican Presidents voiced their 
support for the consumer in public speeches, they were equally influenced by material 
economic conditions and ideological norms that made them hesitant to expand the size of 
the federal bureaucracy. As exemplified by Ford, budgetary qualms were couched in 
ideological norms. His justification for curbing the size of the federal bureaucracy was 
based upon real fiscal constraints and also justified via the language of deregulatory 
sentiment. By the Carter’s term in office, this deregulatory sentiment had influenced 
public opinion and ended the chance of successful consumer legislation that sought to 
create an independent agency.  
  Deregulatory sentiment additionally influenced Southern Democratic Senators 
creating a structural pivot point within a Democratically-dominated Congress. Senator 
Ervin justified his opposition to an independent CPA in deregulatory terms, stating that 
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he “ would say that if a bureaucracy is not functioning in the public interests, as it is 
ordered to do, the remedy is not piling another bureaucracy on top of it.”122 Thus, 
although the Democrats held a majority in Congress from 1969-1978, the ideological 
shift created an opportunity for Southern Democrats to deviate from a homogenous party 
line in favor of consumer interests. The Democratic filibuster that developed in the 
Senate was pivotal in creating gridlock under Republican Presidents.  
 While it is clear that environmental factors did not favor the passage of consumer 
legislation, the question still remains: would it have been possible if consumer political 
entrepreneurs had employed different tactics? The opening of a policy window does not 
predetermine the type of legislation that emerges. Political entrepreneurs must 
successfully couple their issues with environmental factors, such as changes in national 
mood, in order to create policy changes.  
 In the case of the CPA, the business lobby clearly capitalized upon the opening of 
a policy window, creating a new neoconservative rhetoric that they disseminated through 
the media in order to reinforce and to some extent recreate the national mood in favor of 
deregulation. The consumer lobby did not respond as strongly. They still framed their 
goal in terms of representing the average citizen at a federal level. They did not adjust to 
national mood and as such the business lobby’s representation of consumerists as elitists 
became the favored compelling narrative. 
  An additional tactical flaw within the consumer lobby was Nader’s idealism. As a 
political entrepreneur that shaped the movement, Nader was crucial to the bill’s success 
or failure.  His unwillingness to compromise delayed the creation of a Consumer 
Protection Agency until the moment for successful consumer legislation had passed. In 
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1969, Rosenthal’s original proposal was in line with President Nixon’s thinking, backed 
by public support, and as such had a good chance of passing. Nixon’s commitment to an 
independent structure, however, prolonged the debate surrounding the CPA for nearly a 
decade until public support for the agency had subsided. His unwillingness to 
compromise made him miss the moment in which he could have improved the state of 
consumers, even if it wasn’t in the manner in which he hoped to do so. The failure of the 
CPA thus was due to a combination of environmental and tactical factors. Unfavorable 
environmental factors set the stage for the failure of consumerists, while the ineffective 
tactics and leadership cemented its fate.  
 
Case Study II: The Formation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
 
 A nearly 30 year hiatus of consumer protection legislation followed Nader’s 
failed attempt to establish a Consumer Protection Agency in 1970. In line with the 
deregulatory norms that defined the last quarter of the 20
th
 century, public policy officials 
and politicians tended to adopt the position that advancing free market norms sufficiently 
protected consumers. It was widely believed that the creation of competition within key 
markets heavily accessed by consumers would lower prices, increase transparency within 
the industry, and push producers to create higher quality products. Furthermore, policy 
makers tended to believe that consumer interest was already adequately protected through 
established agencies such as the Consumer Union. Additional regulation would be either 
superfluous or even counterproductive.  
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 The 96
th
 through 110
th
 Congress did pass legislation that would indirectly benefit 
consumers through stimulating the economy.
123
 However, the federal legislation passed 
during this time period should not be considered typical consumer protection legislation, 
since it was not designed to protect consumers against a concentrated counter-interest.
124
 
It is important to note that I have restricted my study to the federal level. A different story 
emerged on the state level, as consumer legislation continued to pass under health and 
safety concerns. The most prominent example is anti-smoking legislation that has been 
implemented with increasing vigor all across the nation since the 1990s. In other words, 
while the political and ideological climate blocked action on the federal level from the 
late 1970s to the early 2000s, different consumer groups continued to pursue their 
interests through the courts on a state level.  
 To be fair, throughout this thirty year period, experience seemed to prove federal 
policy makers right.  No event questioned the policy makers’ assessment that the current 
institutional structure coupled with an active deregulation of the market would adequately 
protect the consumer. While there were recessions in the early 1980s, the immediate post-
Cold war period, and after 2001, economic growth in the U.S. was maintained at a 
relatively high level throughout the period, outstripping that of most other advanced 
industrial economies. Unemployment remained low, as did inflation.  
 Some may wonder why when all of Mayer’s environmental determinants were 
present— such as during part of the Clinton Presidency— consumer protection 
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legislation failed to emerge. Since a policy window did not open due to a lack of 
galvanizing event, consumer protection did not appear on the public policy agenda during 
these intermediary years. The financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent Great 
Recession, however, shook the assumption that consumers were adequately protected to 
its core. Consumer protection legislation once again moved to the forefront of the public 
policy agenda.  
   
Legislative History of Title X 
 The notion of a Consumer Protection Bureau was first conceived in President 
Obama’s “White Papers", a series of suggested financial reform following the 2008 
crisis. A version of the bill H.R. 3126 was amended and reported to the House by the 
Committee on Financial Services and by the Committee on Energy and Commerce. H.R. 
3126 was later logrolled with nine other bills and passed by the House under Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173). A similar but separate 
measure on consumer protection S. 3127 was amended and reported by the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and passed under the Senate’s 
version of the Dodd-Frank bill. For procedural purposes the Senate did not change the 
House’s bill number. Rather it inserted its amended text into H.R. 4173 and passed the 
measure. A conference committee reviewed and passed the bill, which was signed into 
public law 111-203 by President Obama on July 21, 2010.
125
  
On July 8, 2009, Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) introduced “The 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act”, H.R. 3126, to the House. The bill was co-
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sponsored by 18 Democrats: Gary Ackerman (NY-5), Michael Capuano (MA-8), Judy 
Chu (CA-32), Danny Davis (IL-17), Keith Ellison (MN-5), Alan Grayson (FL-8), Al 
Green (TX-9), Luis Gutierrez (IL-4), Jesse Jackson (IL-2), Sheila Jackson-Lee (TX-18), 
Henry Johnson (GA-4), Carolyn Maloney (NY-14), Bradley Miller (NC-13), Brad 
Sherman (CA-27), Jackie Speier (CA-12), Louise Slaughter (NY-28), Maxine Waters 
(CA-35), and Melvin Watt (NC-12).
126
 The Act was referred to the House Committee on 
Financial Services and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. On October 22, 
2009 the House Committee on Financial Services considered H.R. 3126 and ordered 
reported the bill, amended, by a recorded vote of 39 yeas to 29 nays. On October 29, 
2009, the Committee on Energy and Commerce met to consider the bill. After further 
amending the bill, they reported it to the House by a recorded vote of 33 yeas to 19 nays. 
H.R. 3126 was one of nine bills that were reported to the House and consolidated into the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Dodd-Frank was passed 
through the House on December 11, 2009.
127
 
 On March 20, 2010, Senator Chris Dodd published his version of a massive draft 
legislation, “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009”, S. 3217. The section 
of the act that delineates the plan for consumer protection is Title X, the “Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency Act of 2010.” It is similar to HR 3126 as approved by the 
House Financial Services Committee but has several key differences.  
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 H.R. 4173 Title VI established the Consumer Financial Protection Agency as a 
freestanding regulatory agency. In the short term, the agency would be headed by a 
presidentially appointed and senatorially confirmed director. Three and a half years after 
the bill’s enactment, a five-member commission would replace the director.  The CFPA 
would primarily examine banks and credit unions with over 10 billion in assets, but the 
agency could regulate institutions below this threshold. In terms of funding, ten percent 
of the Federal Reserve System’s total expenses would be transferred to the CFPA. 128 
 The senatorial version placed the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau within 
the Federal Reserve. While the Federal Reserve Board was allowed to “delegate to the 
Bureau the authorities to examine persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Board for 
compliance with the Federal consumer financial laws”129, it did not have the authority to 
restrict regulation passed by the CFPB. Additionally, S. 3217 eliminated the eventual 
transfer of power from a direction to a board. To check the power of the Bureau, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council would have the ability to stay a regulation 
prescribed by the Bureau if the regulation “would put the safety and soundness of the US 
banking system of the stability of the financial system of the US at risk.”130 Furthermore 
the Senate’s bill limited the Bureau’s ability to supervise non-depository institutions and 
institutions with under 10 billion in assets.  
 On May 19, 2010, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
amended Title X of 3217 and reported it to the Senate. On May 20, 2010, the Senate 
passed H.R. 4173 after substituting the text of the RAFSA as amended into the bill by a 
                                                        
128 David H. Carpenter and Mark Jickling, “Financial Regulatory Reform: Consumer Financial 
Protection Proposals” Congressional Research Service, May 26 2010, 6-8 
129 Carpenter and Jickling, “Financial Regulatory Reform”, 9 
130 Carpenter and Jickling, “Financial Regulatory Reform”, 14 
 76 
recorded vote of 59 yeas to 39 nays. The House accepted changes to H.R. 4173 on June 
30, 2010 as did the Senate on July 15, 2010. On July 21
st
, 2010, President Obama signed 
the bill into law P.L. 111-203.
131
 
 
The Resurgence of Keynesianism Post 2008  
 The 2007-2008 financial crisis devastated the global economy, calling into 
question the deregulatory norms that had dominated academic and Congressional thought 
for the past thirty years. The crisis and the Great Recession that followed left 26 million 
Americans unemployed or underemployed, caused 4 million families to lose their home 
to foreclosure with another 4.5 million in the foreclosure process, depleted 11 trillion 
dollars in household wealth, and hit small and large businesses alike.
132
 The massive 
devastation caused by the crisis once again opened a policy window. This time, however, 
national mood shifted in manner that proved favorable to the consumer movement.  
 While scholars disagree on the factors that led to the financial crisis, the Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Report cites negligible regulation, low interest rates, the availability of 
credit, and toxic mortgages that were packaged and repackaged into increasing complex 
securities as the key factors that initiated the crisis in the fall of 2008.
133
 One key factor 
that began in the 1970s and led up to the financial crisis was the growth of the shadow 
banking sector—investment banks as well as non-financial institutions that were not 
subject to regulation under the system established following the Great Depression. The 
                                                        
131 Baird Webel, “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Issues and 
Summary”, 1 
132 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report” US Government 
Printing Office (February 25, 2011) p. xv 
133 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report,” xvii 
 77 
growth of this sector when paired with federal regulators’ belief that emergent dual 
system would police itself proved devastating. 
 In 1975, investment banks such as Merrill Lynch took advantage of the Glass-
Steagall Act’s Regulation Q, which set interest rate limits for commercial banks and 
thrifts, and created money market mutual funds, pools of safe assets that individuals 
could invest in to gain a higher return. Although these pools were not guaranteed by 
federal deposits, the high return proved attractive to investors who flocked to the new 
investment opportunity.
134
 Mutual funds principally invested in commercial paper and the 
repo market, short-term debt that theoretically was easy to turnover.  The shadow 
banking system challenged traditional banking system, attracting investors to higher 
yields. Commercial banks and thrifts began to pressure Congress to deregulate the 
financial sector, arguing that the Glass-Steagall Act was making them uncompetitive and 
preventing economic growth.
135
  
 The lobbying of the traditional banking sector paired with the deregulatory 
ideology of the time proved effective. In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act eliminated the interest rate caps that depository institutions 
could offer to investors.
136
  In 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Act expanded the types of 
loans that thrifts could offer, and in 1983 and 1994 the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) expanded the range of derivatives that banks could deal.
137
  While the 
saving and loans crisis of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in some stricter thrift regulation, 
the overall trend toward greater deregulation continued. In 1991, the Treasury 
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Department called for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which was accomplished in 
1999 through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
138
  
 This deregulatory trend was partially a product of the free market ideology 
advanced by Alan Greenspan and others, who believed that financial institutions would 
not violate the principle of self-preservation and thus would implement effective risk 
management.  In 1997, Greenspan appealed to Congress to “remove outdated restrictions 
that serve no useful purpose that decrease economic efficiency and limit choices and 
options for the consumer of financial services.”139 The result of the financial lobby as 
well as free market ideology was, as The Financial Inquiry Report puts it, that “the 
sentries were not at their posts”— key regulatory precautions had been eliminated leaving 
the financial system vulnerable to crisis.
140
   
 Unchecked by government intervention in the years leading up to the crisis, the 
shadow banking system grew in opaque and complicated ways. This system utilized the 
hot money found in the repo lending market, OTC derivatives, off balance sheet entities 
and “window dressing” of financial statements available to the public.141 Regulators thus 
underestimated the risks held by financial institutions. Contrary to the theory advanced 
by Greenspan, too many firms assumed risky positions, over-levering with high debt to 
capital reserve ratios and found themselves excessively dependent upon short-term 
funding. In 2007, Bear Sterns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and 
Morgan Stanley were levered as high as 40 to 1, a ratio so high that a 3% drop in asset 
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values would result in bankruptcy.
142
 Compensatory schemes incentivized financial 
brokers to think short term and profit off risky trades. These over-leveraged positions set 
the stage for the crisis.  
 The second key contributor to the 2007-2008 financial crisis was the growth of 
the over-the-counter (OTC) derivative market. In the fall of 2008, the crisis began when 
the housing bubble that had been forming within the American economy burst. The 
effects of this shock were not limited to the retail sector but were felt throughout the 
entire American economy as well as globally due to the dissemination of risk through 
new complex securities. The creation of credit default swaps allowed investors to buy 
protection on their mortgage-backed securities to hedge against the possible non-
performance of the security.  Additionally, collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
allowed for the pooling of risk from mortgage-backed securities and CDSs, which would 
then be sorted into tranches based upon risk. Unlike traditional derivatives that were used 
for corporate hedging, CDOs existed purely for speculative purposes. There were also 
CDOs squared which were also asset-backed securities but were based upon the original 
CDOs. At the time, it seemed that “risk had been conquered” since “investors held highly 
rated securities, banks thought they had taken the riskiest loans off their books and 
regulators saw firms making profits” but “each step of the mortgage securitization 
pipeline depended on the next step to keep demand going.”143 Purchasers of the security 
believed that these instruments were extremely liquid and able to be offloaded due to 
their high demand at the time of purchase. Unfortunately, they were wrong. These new 
financial instruments concentrated risk in opaque ways and spread the risk associated 
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with the default of a mortgage far past the original buyers and seller of that transaction. 
The scale of mortgage backed securities’ dissemination also contributed to spreading the 
risk globally. From July 1, 2004 to May 31, 2007, Goldman Sachs sold 73 billion dollars 
worth of CDOs.
144
 When the original borrower defaulted on a mortgage, the effects 
rippled throughout the globe. 
 Following the burst of the housing bubble, the government found itself 
unprepared to respond to the far-reaching nature of the crisis. Although some regulators 
had foreseen the formation of the housing bubble, they did not anticipate the international 
consequences that would result from the crash of a seemingly isolated sector of the 
American economy. Regulators implemented ad hoc policies that responded to 
manifestations of the crisis at any given moment. However, they lacked a comprehensive 
strategy since they did not understand the intricacies of the global derivatives market, 
which had magnified the effects of the crisis. However, one fact had become clear: the 
free market ideology that had dominated public discourse for the past thirty years and led 
to the deregulation of the financial system had proved ineffective.  Although corporations 
and financial institutions were concerned with their self-preservation, adverse incentives 
had caused them to act for short-term gain rather than long-term stability. Deregulation 
might have functioned on a microeconomic scale. But, a greater level of federal 
regulation was necessary in order to provide stability within an increasingly 
interconnected, global economy.    
 As such, the global financial crisis of 2008 once again cast doubt upon the 
currently accepted economic wisdom, marking a return to Keynesian ideology and 
policy. As Henry Farrel and John Quiggins state, “Over an extremely short period of 
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time, the apparent consensus among academic economists shifted from an anti-Keynesian 
to a pro-Keynesian stance. Clearly this was provoked by the economic crisis.”145 While 
one could hardly find an academic or a politician in the late 1970s who supported 
Keynesian norms, by 2009 even previously pro-market academics, such as Richard 
Posner and Martin Feldstein, publically pushed for Keynesian type stimulus packages.
146
 
This ideological shift was not restricted to the academic world but had real policy 
implications as well. In the US the question was not whether or not to implement a 
stimulus it was of what size.
147
  
 The 2007-2008 financial crisis thus marked a historical moment of political 
transformation leading to what Daniel Carpenter characterizes as the “democratization of 
finance policymaking.”148 As Carpenter observes, American policy networks had become 
increasingly exclusive throughout the twentieth century. Appointments to the top 
government financial positions were drawn from the top Wall Street banks and regulatory 
agencies creating a “gilded network” of financial policy elites.149 The large-scale 
devastation caused by the crisis, however, undermined claim that only qualified 
academics and professionals could understand the intricacies of the economy and 
meaningfully contribute to financial policy debates.
150
 The debates on financial reform 
following the financial crisis in 2009 and 2010 were not restricted to a small number of 
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top policy makers but included the opinion of groups that historically have lacked 
bargaining power, such as consumer advocates and labor unions.
151
 Carpenter sites the 
robust participation in these financial debates following the financial crisis to claim that 
“something has changed, albeit temporarily.” A “social aperture” has opened in for 
Progressive and liberal groups within financial policy.
152
 
 Substantiating Carpenter’s claim with public opinion data from 1971-2011, 
Lindsay A Owens finds that public confidence in Wall Street fell massively following the 
2008 financial crisis and during the Great Recession. Between 2006 and 2010, the 
percent of Americans with “a great deal of confidence” in banks decreased 19% while the 
percent of Americans with a “hardly any” confidence increased by 29%, from 13% to an 
all-time high of 42%.
153
 Adopting an event-driven analysis of public opinion, Owens 
concludes that this massive shift goes beyond the typical correlation between public 
opinion and economic conditions and was instead driven by the “moral outrage coupled 
with economic insecurity”.154 This outrage can be seen in the public’s increasingly 
negative views regarding the ethics of bankers. In a 1996 poll conducted by Harris, 43% 
of those polled agreed that people on Wall Street were “as ethnical and honest as other 
people.” By 2006, this number had fallen by almost 20% to 26% of adults polled. Owen 
concludes that the scandals associated with the Great Recession— such as the bank 
bailouts, predatory lending scandals and “robo-signing” scandal of 2010— amplified the 
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typical loss of public confidence in the financial sector during times of economic crisis, 
creating a favorable moment for financial reform. 
155
  
 
Keynesian Centralization and the Obama Administration 
 Even before the shift from a free market to a Keynesian ideology was cemented 
by the devastation caused by the 2008 financial crisis, Obama rejected laissez-faire 
policies that had characterized Washington in the previous decades. In The Audacity of 
Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream, Obama criticizes George W. 
Bush’s “devotion to reduced regulations” and the central “belief that government 
regulation inhibits and distorts the efficient working of the market.”156 Instead, Obama 
advocated utilizing the “resources and power of the federal government to facilitate a 
vibrant, free market.”157 In this work, we can see the seeds of Keynesian thought, namely 
the need for government intervention in order to facilitate a well-functioning economy. 
The 2008 financial crisis, however, created a moment in which Obama could implement 
stronger government oversight of the market. As public sentiment turned resoundingly 
against Wall Street and the failure of free market ideology became apparent in academic 
as well as policy circles, the President obtained the necessary support for major reform.  
 It was against this backdrop of favorable public sentiment that Obama emerged as 
a strong consumer protection advocate. The concept of a Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau originated in President Obama’s White Papers. The CFPB as formulated by 
                                                        
155 Owens, “The Polls,” 161 
156 Steven L. Arxer, Matthew Babcock and Walter Borges, “Progressivism and Economics: The Case of 
President Obama” in Grading the 44th President: A Report Card on Barack Obama’s First Term As a 
Progressive Leader Ed. Luigi Esposito and Laura L. Finley (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO LLC., 
2012), 24 
157 Arxer, Babcock and Borges, “Progressivism and Economics,” 24 
 84 
Obama would be an independent regulatory agency that would seek “to protect 
consumers across the financial sector from unfair, deceptive, and abusive practices.”158 
While consumer protection had been monitored by a range of agencies in the past, 
Obama proposed consolidating the disparate functions of agencies— the creation of rules, 
examination of administrative breaches and enforcement of penalties— under one roof.  
Furthermore, the agency would be headed by a single Director rather than a Board. 
Obama hoped that this consolidation of authority would help prevent the “regulatory race 
to the bottom” and regulatory arbitrage that helped precipitate the 2008 financial crisis.159 
The CFPB would be granted authority over all banking institutions currently monitored 
by the federal government as well as non-banking institutions that had previously been 
beyond the scope of consumer protection. In terms of enforcement, the Obama 
administration proposed granting the CFPB the power to “’subpoena authority for 
documents and testimony’, authority to ‘intervene in… actions[s],’ which arise from the 
violation of its regulations, and authority ‘to request that the U.S. Attorney General bring 
any action necessary to enforce its subpoena authority or to bring any other enforcement 
action on its behalf in the appropriate court’.” 160  
 Obama’s original proposal set the stage for Congressional debate over the terms. 
While several changes were made regarding the specific powers of the CFPB in the 
enacted bill, the agency remained true to the key tenants of President Obama’s original 
proposal, establishing an independent structure headed by a single Director with the 
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power to dictate and enforce consumer protection rules. In the post-2008 financial crisis 
push for the formation of a federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Presidential 
support proved to be a crucial environmental factor. Obama’s White Papers set the tone 
for Congressional debate and pressured congressmen to reach across the aisle regarding 
controversial provisions. 
 
Bicameral Politics: Composition of the House and Senate 
 As we saw in the previous case study, the passage of legislation depends not only 
upon Presidential but also upon Congressional support. Mayer claims that a 
democratically stacked Congress is an environmental factor favorable to the passage of 
consumer protection legislation. The validity of Mayer’s claim, however, is contingent 
upon representatives within the same party having homogenous preferences. In the 
1970s, this assumption proved false due to the prevalence of Southern Democrats within 
Congress, who tended to hold more conservative preferences that led to a division within 
the Democratic Party. In fact, parties’ ideological positions in the late 1960s and early 
1970s were closer to each other than they would ever be again.
161
 Surveying the positions 
of both Democrats and Republicans in 1968, third-party presidential candidate George 
Wallace commented, “there ain’t a dime’s worth of difference between them.”162 
 In the 1980s, however, party preferences began to polarize as the Democratic 
Party became more liberal and the Republican Party became more conservative.
163
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Whereas in the 1968, 60% of the Congressional members held moderate middle 
positions, by 2004 only 25% of members fell in the middle of the ideological 
continuum.
164
 Polarization is driven by two key mechanisms: member adaptation and 
member replacement. Member adaption occurs when congressional members adopt a 
more extreme preference. Scholars agree that the primary source of polarization has been 
member replacement. When members retire, run for higher office, fail to be re-elected or 
die, they tend to be replaced by more ideologically extreme members (Bullock, 2000; 
Carson et al., 2003). Furthermore, scholars agree that the majority of member 
replacements have stemmed from the replacement of moderate southern Democrats with 
conservative Republicans.
165
  This process is often referred to as the Republican 
Realignment in the South.  
 The Republican Realignment in the South led to homogenous preferences within 
the Democratic and Republican Party, dividing the debate over the powers and structure 
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau along clear bipartisan lines. Democrats in 
the House and Senate stood in favor of the establishment of a CFPB and Republicans 
against. Under conditions of homogenous preferences, however, the Democratic majority 
in the 111
th
 Congress in both the House and the Senate created a favorable environment 
for the establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Consumer protection 
no longer functioned as a wedge issue dividing the Democratic Party. Unlike the 1970s, a 
Democratic majority now truly meant a majority in favor of regulation. Within this 
session of Congress, the House of Representatives was composed of 256 Democrats 
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versus 178 Republicans and the Senate held 55 Democrats, 2 Independents and 41 
Republicans.  
 
Polarized Party Debates on the CFPB 
 From its inception, the CFPB has been the elephant in the room of financial 
regulation and one of the principle causes of the bipartisan divide on Dodd-Frank.
166
 The 
financial service industry as well as most Republican Congressmen vigorously opposed 
the creation of the CFPB. Financial industry trade groups such as the US Chamber of 
Commerce and the American Bankers Association poured ample time and resources into 
blocking the passage of Title X
167
, fearing that the legislation would restrict the diversity 
of products that could be offered and raise the costs associated with regulatory 
compliance. As in the early 1970s, during the Nixon Administration, the key controversy 
surrounding the formation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was not its 
utility or necessity within society, but rather its institutional design. The original debate 
hinged upon whether consumer protection should be monitored by a new independent 
agency, an idea advanced by Obama and supported by the House, or whether an existing 
agency should be granted this new authority, the view supported by the financial service 
sector and Republican Congressmen.  
 Consumer protection was originally monitored by seven different agencies and 
enforced through at least 18 different laws. Title X consolidates the enforcement of these 
numerous laws under one agency that also has additional lawmaking capabilities. This 
                                                        
166 Stacey Kaper, “Dodd Recounts Battle Over Reg Reform”, American Banker, November 8th, 2010 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_162/dodd-1024486-1.html 
167 See Brody Mullins, “Chamber Ad Campaign Targets Consumer Agency” Wall Street Journal, 
September 8, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125236911298191113.html 
 88 
considerable power is further enhanced by the agency’s structure as an independent body, 
which is subject to very little legislative or executive oversight. While independent 
agencies serve a purpose, mainly to avoid regulatory capture by insulating the agency 
from interest group pressure,
 168
 the CFPB under the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Financial Protection Act has powers that extend beyond the typical 
freestanding agency. As the Harvard Law Review noted, the bureau has several insulation 
mechanisms that exceed the power of a typical independent agency. Rather than a 
multimember board, the agency is headed by a single director for a five-year term who is 
only removable for cause. Although the Bureau is housed within the Federal Reserve, the 
Fed cannot intervene in its decisions. Additionally, the CFPB has an independent source 
of revenue in that the Director can request a transfer from the Fed up to a statutory cap. 
The control mechanisms acting upon the CFPB are that they must consult with the 
“appropriate prudential regulators or other agencies prior to proposing a rule”. However, 
the Bureau can object to these consultations subject to releasing a statement explaining 
why it rejected the advice. Furthermore a two-third majority of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council can veto CFPB regulations. 
169
 
 Thus, the most prevalent complaint leveled against the current structure of the 
CFPB is that it embodies a traditional “command and control structure”, lacking 
substantial checks and balances that could mitigate its regulatory prowess.
170
  The CPFB 
was portrayed as an omnipotent agency that would stifle financial innovation and 
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flexibility in consumer services and products. Republicans sided with the financial 
service industry in objecting to the formation of an independent bureau and insisting that 
this regulatory function be kept within the federal bank regulators.
171
  
 Initial Republican opposition to the CPFB was advanced by Senator Shelby (R-
Ala), who proposed S. 3826 as an alternative to Senator Dodd’s Title X of S. 3217. Under 
Shelby’s legislation, the CFPB would have been housed under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and severely restricted in its regulatory abilities. The CFPB would 
have had to obtain FDIC approval before issuing any rule. Furthermore, all depository 
institutions as well as most nonbank financial institutions would have been exempt from 
CFPB oversight.
172
 Senator Dodd’s placement of the CFPB within the Federal Reserve 
was seen as a way to compromise with the Republican opposition. Republican 
complained that the House bill, which created the CFPB as a freestanding agency, was 
advancing the creation of a  “consumer protection czar.” Senator Shelby’s amendment 
was rejected by a vote of 38 yeas to 61 nays. All those in favor were Republican and the 
majority of those against were Democratic. The exceptions were Olympia Snowe (R-
ME), Charles Grassley (R-IA) and Robert Bennet (R-MA). All three representatives have 
a long history of voting against the Republican Party.
173
 In part, this could be because, all 
three are considered ideological moderates and owe their seats to the democratic and 
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independent vote.
174
 Even without their support, however, the Democrats had a 
commanding majority in Congress and could successfully block Republican opposition to 
a strong federal Consumer Financial Protection Agency. Ultimately the bill was passed 
without substantial structural changes. As such, when examining the environment in 
which the CFPB came into being, it is clear that congressional composition proved a key 
factor. 
 The shift in Congressional composition following the 2010 elections has created 
anxiety among consumerists who fear that Republicans will finally have sufficient power 
to weaken the power the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. The financial sector 
backed the Republicans in the 2010 congressional elections, helping the Republicans 
secure the House and gain additional seats in the Senate.
175
 From this heightened position 
of power, Republicans have launched a new campaign to weaken the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau. Proposed amendments attempted to check the bureau’s power by 
adjusting its structure as well as its budget. 
  On July 21, 2011, the House passed Republican Representative Sean Duffy’s (W-
07) H.R. 1315. Representatives Spencer Bachus (AL-6), Shelley Moore Capito (WV-2), 
John R. Carter (TX-31), and David B. McKinley (WV-1) co-sponsored the bill. The bill 
substantially restricted the CFPB’s powers by establishing a five-member committee to 
oversee the bureau, suspending all powers of the CFPB until the Senate confirmed a 
director, and granting FSOC a vote to override any CFPB provision which it deemed 
would threaten the “safe and sound” operations of US financial institutions. In the 
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previous version of Dodd-Frank, CFPB members were not permitted to take part in the 
vote. The Bill passed with 241 yeas to 173 nays and 18 abstentions. Ten Democrats voted 
in favor while one Republican voted against, Walter Jones (NC-3).
176
 It was subsequently 
referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.  
In the House, efforts were also made to limit the CFPB’s power through changes 
in its funding. Republican Representative Jo Ann Emerson (MO-8) introduced Financial 
Services and General Government Appropriations Act, H.R. 2434 to the House. Section 
101 suggested that a 200 million dollar funding cap be placed upon the bureau, a 40% cut 
from what President Obama recommended. Section 102 of the act made the CFPB’s 
budget subject to Congressional appropriations starting in fiscal year 2013 rather than a 
transfer from the Federal Reserve’s expenses. The Obama administration voiced 
opposition to Representative Emerson’s plan, claiming that it would “compromise the 
Bureau’s independence and limit expenditures to levels that would severely undercut the 
agency’s statutory responsibility to oversee consumer financial products such as 
mortgages and credit cards.”177 The Act was reported favorably by the House Committee 
on Appropriations but has yet to be enacted.  
 Similar efforts to reform the CFPB were made in the Senate. Senator Shelby with 
the support of 44 Republican Senators spearheaded an effort to block the Presidential 
nominee to head the CFPB. In July 2011, Obama named Richard Cordray, former 
Attorney General of Ohio, to lead the Bureau. Republican Senators refused to support the 
nomination—leaving the Bureau without a director— until the three changes proposed by 
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the House were adopted. In particular, Republicans stressed the need for a five-member 
board rather than a single director of the CFPB, a budget subject to Congressional 
appropriations, and allowing federal bank regulators to oversee CFPB regulations.
178
 
With 44 of 47 Republicans voting against the nominee, Democrats were unable to garner 
the 60 necessary votes and end the filibuster to name a director of the bureau leaving it 
unable to act in the interim.
179
 The only Republicans not to sign were Scott Brown (MA) 
and Lisa Murkowski (ALA). In January 2010, however, Obama sidestepped Republican 
opposition and announced that that he was using a recess appointment to name Cordray 
the acting director, ending the Republican filibuster.   
 Obama’s use of a recess appointment once again signals to the public his strong 
support for consumer protection and his belief in a federal agency devoted to this cause. 
Those who think that a change in Senatorial or House composition will necessarily alter 
resulting legislation overlook the fact that the American system is essentially a tricameral 
one, with the President acting as a check upon Congress. In the case of consumer 
protection, the President’s support for the CFPB has proved favorable for consumerists. 
To date, Obama’s support has been able to check Republican opposition in the House and 
Senate. As Mayer aptly noted, policy making often happens outside of the legislative 
process. The executive branch influences policy through key appointments and 
influencing certain bureaucratic compositions.  
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The CFPB: Conclusion Regarding Environmental Factors  
 The 2008-2010 lobby for an independent Consumer Financial Protection Agency 
took place against an environmental backdrop primed for success. Public sentiment, 
Presidential support and Congressional composition were all tipped in favor of 
meaningful consumer reform. The 2008 financial crisis had proved that the free market 
paradigm that had dominated policy circles for the last quarter of the century was 
ineffective. Politicians and the public alike had begun to support a more Keynesian 
governmental regulation of the market.  
 This paradigm shift set the stage for President Obama, a progressive democratic 
president who supported establishing a federal agency to protect consumer from 
predatory business practices, to push for meaningful reform. Presidential support proved 
crucial in the framing of the legislation. President Obama’s commitment to an 
independent bureau with considerable regulatory oversight held Congressional legislative 
proposals to a high standard.  Furthermore, Presidential support proved crucial in the 
execution of the legislation. Notably, Obama used a recess appointment to name Richard 
Corday acting director of the CFPB in order to overcome a Republican filibuster that 
would prevent the agency from becoming operational.  
 Despite Republican opposition, the Congressional composition also was a 
favorable factor in the establishment of the CFPB. The process of party polarization that 
began in the 1980s had led to more homogenous preferences within the Democratic and 
Republican Party. Unlike in the 1970s, Democrats were not longer divided along regional 
lines with Southerners aligning more closely with Republican positions. The 111
th
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thus proved crucial in building a strong coalition that had historically been in favor of 
consumer protection. The environment alone, however, can only provide an opportunity 
for reform. Political entrepreneurs had to capitalize on this moment in order to push 
through their agendas.  
 
A Tactical Utilization of Anti-Wall Street Sentiment 
The emergence of Pro-CFPA
180
 lobbyist rhetoric 
 
 In the 1970s the business lobby had capitalized on the deregulatory sentiment in 
order to rebrand the consumer mission as an inefficient elitist ploy that would increase 
the size of the bureaucracy and hinder a well-functioning economy. Following the 2008 
financial crisis a framing opportunity presented itself to pro-CFPA advocates. Under 
Nader, consumer protection was viewed as a positive goal in and of itself. The 1970s 
consumerist campaign was based upon a rational appeal to represent consumer interest in 
government. In contrast to this rational appeal, the 2010 consumer lobby capitalized on 
public sentiment that had turned resoundingly against Wall Street and big business in 
general. The pro-CFPA lobby depicted consumer protection as an essential step needed to 
reverse the status quo, a society dominated by the 1%, and re-empower the people. In 
order to make this claim, the rhetoric of the pro-CFPA lobby mirrored the anger felt by 
the public. 
 The pro-CFPA lobby utilized a three-pronged argument to channel public anger 
and assert the necessity of reform. The pro-CFPA narrative first demonized the financial 
                                                        
180 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Consumer Financial Protection Agency are the 
same proposal. It just depends what point in time you looked at the proposal. Earlier reports tend to 
call the agency a CFPA but under Dodd-Frank it was renamed to a CFPB. They acronyms are 
interchangeable for the purpose of my paper. 
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service industry, characterizing it as greedy profit-seeking enterprise that benefitted from 
the average citizen’s misfortune. It then sought to tap into common sense norms of 
fairness to gain further support from angry citizens, asserting that although Wall Street’s 
reckless actions had led to the demise of the economy, bankers continued to gain in the 
form of large bonuses while the public bore the cost of bailing out the banks. It then 
created a divide between Wall Street and the American public, as exemplified by the 
phrase Wall Street vs. Main Street. This dichotomy created a zero-sum game in the eyes 
of pro-CFPA lobbyist rhetoric; a win for Big Banks would mark a loss for consumers and 
vice versa.  
 While the 1970 consumer lobby had been framed within the positive goal of 
advancing the interest of the average American on a federal level, the 2009 push for a 
CFPA was framed in opposition to Wall Street. The pro-CFPA lobby villanized both 
Wall Street and bankers. In their 2009-2010 press releases, Americans for Financial 
Reform repeatedly dubbed Wall Street bankers “fat cats”181 and characterized banks as 
“greedy”182 and “reckless”183. This characterization was not restrictively used by pro-
                                                        
181 See AFR Press Release from December 14, 2009, which states “fat cat compensation has nothing 
to do with good corporate performance”  
182 See AFR Press Release from January 15, 2010 which states, “The CFPA will protect working 
families and small businesses by reining in the greedy, reckless behavior of big banks on Wall 
Street...” 
See AFR Press release from January 21, 2010 which quotes Heather McGhee, D.C. Director of Demos 
“The President has now drawn a line in the sand for Congress – stand with those greedy big banks 
that got us into this mess or demand transparency and accountability from Wall Street.” 
See AFR Press Release from February 5, 2010 in which Heather Booth, Executive Director of 
Americans for Financial Reform states,” While we would have hope both sides of the aisle could have 
come to a consensus on the bill as a whole, the need to rein in the greedy and reckless behavior of big 
banks is too important to be delayed by partisan bickering” 
183 See AFR Press Release from January 13, 2010 which states, “AFR calls on big banks to not only 
justify their reckless behavior but also explain why they are working to kill real reforms that would 
keep them from doing it again” 
See quote above from January 15, 2010 AFR press release 
See AFR Press Release from February 10, 2010 which states that, “Senator Cantwell calls an end to 
reckless speculation and calls to rebuild the economy” 
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CFPA lobbying groups but was even employed by government leaders. In an interview 
with CBS on December 12, 2009, President Obama stated that he “did not run for office 
to be helping out a bunch of fat cat bankers on Wall Street.”184 Press releases by the AFR 
additionally targeted specific banks and individuals that the group claimed had 
contributed to predatory lending and the demise of the financial system. By continually 
reiterating the negative stereotypes associated with their rivals, the pro-CFPA lobby 
capitalized on public sentiment that had turned resoundingly against Wall Street.  
 Pro-CFPA lobbyists furthermore attempted to incite anger toward Wall Street by 
referencing the inequality between bankers who received large bonuses while citizens 
suffered from poor economic conditions and paid increased taxes to finance bailouts. On 
a poster calling for national consumer mobilization on November 13, 2009, AFR stated, 
“Wall Street firms like Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo bailed out by 
our tax dollars are back to making record profits and on track to hand out multi-billion 
dollar bonuses. Meanwhile millions of regular folks are suffering from job losses, 
foreclosures, depleted pensions and skyrocketing credit car rates and overdraft fees.”185 
                                                                                                                                                                     
See above quote from AFR Press Release on February 5, 2010 
See AFR Press Release from March 15, 2010  in which Heather Booth states, “The American public 
has been at the mercy of the Big Banks and their reckless behavior for too long” 
See AFR Press Release from April 19, 2010 in which Heather Booth States “A year and a half since the 
reckless behavior of the Big Banks took our economy to the edge of the abyss and cost 8 million 
Americans their jobs… “ 
See April 22, 2010 Press release, in which Heather Booth states, “Will they stand with Main Street 
which has been devastated by the reckless behavior of Big Banks, or will they stand with Wall Street 
who wants to continue business as usual” 
See AFR Press release from May 21, 2010 in which Heather Booth states, “We are pleased the Senate 
has passed this momentous bill that will rein in big banks’ reckless behavior and bring transparency 
to our financial system and protect consumers.” 
184 60 Minutes on CBS News. “Obama slams ‘Fat Cat Bankers’.”60 Minutes video, 2:09. December 13, 
2009. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5975092n 
185 Admin, “National People’s Action Organizes Hundred to Converge on Goldman Sachs DC HQ on 
Monday, Nov. 16” in American for Financial Reform Press Release Archive (November 13, 2009) 
http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2009/11/hundreds-to-converge-on-goldman-sachs-dc-hq-on-
monday-nov-16/ 
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In citing this inequality, pro-CFPA lobbyists not only meant to incite anger but channel it 
toward their goal of establishing a regulatory agency. This two pronged-approach can be 
seen in a speech delivered on April 21, 2010 by Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH), in 
which he stated, “while taxpayers helped Wall Street banks get back on their feet, Main 
Street Americans were not so lucky. Their homes, their jobs, and their retirement 
accounts were lost or put at risk due to big banks that gambled with their money. That’s 
why we need to pass tough Wall Street reform that holds banks accountable and ensures 
transparency in financial information.”186 These types of appeals not only touched upon 
the rational need for increased supervision over a previously unchecked system but also 
appealed to public anger regarding inequality between banks and citizens.  
 A final facet of the pro-CFPA rhetoric sought to create a divide between Wall 
Street and the American public as represented by the consumerists. This defined the pro-
CFPA lobby as a reactionary one and created an identifiable financial interest that they 
were fighting against. While the consumer lobby of the 1970s sought to advance a 
consumer interest that was not well represented, the advancement of the consumer did not 
necessarily have to come at the demise of the business lobby. One can see this divide 
most clearly in the AFR slogan “Vote for Main Street, Not Wall Street”, but it is also 
present in the pro-CFPA lobbyists’ speeches. Heather Booth asked Congressional 
representatives if “they stand with Main Street which has been devastated by the reckless 
behavior of the Big Banks, or will they stand with Wall Street who wants to continue 
                                                        
186 Admin, “Americans Take to the Streets Demanding an End to the Era of Big Bank Recklessness.” 
From Americans for Financial Reform Press Release Archive on April 21, 210 
http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2010/04/americans-take-to-the-streets-demanding-an-end-to-the-
era-of-big-bank-recklessness/ 
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business as usual.”187 Myra Lewis, a community leader with national People’s Action 
asked, “Which side are you on? The people’s or the big banks?” Similarly in an AFR 
press release stated, “If big banks win, consumers will lose.” The pro-CFPA rhetoric thus 
had a polarizing characteristic that seemed to suggest that only one side could win, and it 
ought to be David not Goliath.
188
 This rhetoric was meant to create a sense of solidarity 
amongst the American public at large, which the pro-CFPA forces envisioned as standing 
against a smaller portion of the population, Wall Street bankers.  
 In designing their campaign for financial reform, pro-CFPA forces successfully 
framed their legislative proposal in terms that could be sold to the public. Feeding off of 
anti-Wall Street sentiment, they depicted their goal to establish a regulatory agency as a 
necessary and well-deserved blow to Wall Street rather than a positive consumer goal in 
and of itself. Their aggressive and often ad hominem tactics drew on the public’s feelings 
that bankers could not be trusted. They turned their opponent’s strength—its vast 
financial resources and power—into a liability by appealing to norms of fairness. Many 
AFR press releases from 2009-2010 focused upon the business lobby’s exorbitant 
spending to discredit the CFPA, linking this spending to the bailout that banks received 
from taxpayer dollars. Appealing to public anger, these statements asked how the 
business lobby could spend a total of 500 million dollars lobbying to destroy an agency 
designed to protect the very taxpayers who were forced to bail the banks out.
189
 Finally 
the rhetoric sought to create a feeling of solidarity amongst the American public, 
                                                        
187 AFR Press Release, “Americans Take to the Streets.”  
188 Nader originally characterized the consumer fight as a fight between David and Goliath. This 
rhetoric reemerged in 2009-2010 and was employed by AFR activists such as Heather Booth. 
189 Admin, “Showdown Main Street v. Wall Street: Americans Travel to Capital Hill to Press for Wall 
Street Reform.” AFR Press Release Archives. April 27, 2010. 
http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2010/04/showdown-main-street-v-wall-street-americans-travel-to-
capitol-hill-to-press-for-wall-street-reform/ 
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represented by small business owners and hardworking citizens, by pitting them against 
the relatively smaller proportion of the population: Wall Street. This “us” vs. “them” 
tactic once again fed off public sentiments of anger and distrust in the financial 
institutions that had contributed to the largest global economic meltdown to date. At the 
same time, it created a positive sense of solidarity amongst consumer advocates.  
 
The Lack of a Framing Opportunity: the Business lobby 
 While the consumer lobby successfully framed their proposal in terms that could 
garner support, the anti-CFPA lobby found itself resorting to old arguments that no 
longer held as much weight with the public. Harkening back to the neoconservative 
rhetoric formed in the 1970s, the anti-CFPA lobby claimed that the creation of an 
independent regulatory agency would create a superagency and expand federal powers at 
the expense of innovation and growth. Furthermore, the anti-CFPA lobby claimed that 
the agency would “deprive consumers of affordability and choice”, since many small 
businesses would face rising costs due to increased costs of regulation that would either 
be passed on to the consumer or result in bankruptcy.
190
 While this rhetoric had proved 
effective in 1970 since it reflected the broader deregulatory sentiment present at the time, 
following the financial crisis the same arguments no longer carried the same weight.  
 The use of deregulatory norms to bolster the anti-CFPA’s lobby in 2008 can be 
seen in the US Chamber of Commerce’s “Stop the CFPA” ad campaign. Launched on 
September 8, 2009, the campaign initially reached the public through print and online 
                                                        
190 US Chamber of Commerce Press Release, “US Chamber Mounts Opposition to So-Called Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency,” (September 8, 2009) 
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2009/september/us-chamber-mounts-opposition-so-
called-consumer-financial-protection-a 
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advertising and then expanded to television and radio advertising. David Hirschmann, 
President and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets 
claimed that the “Chamber supports strong consumer protection, but a massive new 
bureaucracy with sweeping powers that will deprive consumers of affordability and 
choice is not the answer.”191 The campaign sought to demonstrate how the passage of a 
CFPA would hinder small businesses that extended credit to customers. The first ad the 
campaign ran depicted a local butcher, who allowed his customers to purchase goods on 
credit from him, and claimed that “virtually every business that extends credit to 
American consumer would be effected—even the local butcher and the credit he extend 
to hi customers.” The ad concluded that the “CFPA is not consumer protection. It is more 
big government.”192 
 In the 1970s, the business lobby’s claim that the consumer protection agency 
represented “big government” and “red tape” resonated with a public committed to 
market deregulation. However, in line with the resurgence of Keynesian economic 
thought following the 2008 financial crisis, the public no longer feared the emergence of 
“big government” and actively pushed for government intervention in the market. The 
anti-CFPA’s use of deregulatory discourse following the crisis thus was not as effective 
as it had been in the 1970s. The trend toward Keynesian thought can be seen in public 
opinion data from 2008. Based on the survey data, around 40% of the population 
supported increased government regulation of the financial industry. Approximately the 
same portion of the population thought that increased government intervention would 
                                                        
191 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Press Release, Sep. 8, 2009 ibid. 
192 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Press Release, Sep. 8, 2009 ibid. 
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benefit the economy. This outweighed the approximately 30% of those surveyed who 
thought that the government should not regulate the economy and the similar percentage 
who believed that intervention would cause more harm than good. 
  
CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, Sep 2008 
In general do you think there is too much, too little or about the amount of government 
regulation of business and industry? 
 
Too Much  38% 
Too Little 42% 
Right Amount 19% 
No Opinion 2% 
 
CBS News/New York Times Poll, Sep 2008 
Do you think the federal government regulates business too much these days, does it 
regulate business too little, or does it impose the right amount of regulation on business? 
 
Too much 21% 
Too little 45% 
Right amount 18% 
Depends 5% 
Don’t know/ No Answer 11% 
 
 
Los Angeles Times/ Bloomberg Poll, Oct 2008 
In general do you think there is too much, too little or about the right amount of 
government regulation of business? 
 
Too much 27% 
Too little 45% 
Right Amount 14% 
Don’t know 14% 
 
 
Gallup Poll, Sep 2008 
In general, do you think there is too much, too little or about the right amount of 
government regulation of business and industry? 
 
Too much 38% 
Too little 27% 
Right Amount 31% 
Don’t know 3% 
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Yale University, Sep 2008 
Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good… Strongly agree, 
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree 
 
Strongly Agree 10% 
Strongly Disagree 39% 
Somewhat Disagree 42% 
Strongly Disagree 9% 
 
 
Quinnipiac University Poll, Mar 2008 
President (Barack) Obama has said he wants increased government regulation of 
business. Do you think this will be good for the economy, bad for the economy or will 
not affect the economy? 
 
Good 47% 
Bad 36% 
Not affect 9% 
Don’t know/No answer 8% 
 
 
 
The Role of Political Entrepreneurs: Elizabeth Warren 
 Following in Nader’s footsteps, Elizabeth Warren has come to be the most 
prominent consumer advocate of the 21
st
 century. Born in Oklahoma to Pauline and 
Donald Jones, Warren was the youngest of four children. Her father worked as a janitor 
while her mother earned extra money working at the catalog-order department of Sears. 
The family’s modest living made Warren acutely aware of the problems facing the 
middle class at a young age. Demonstrating a high degree of academic aptitude at an 
early age, Warren received a debate scholarship to attend George Washington University 
at the age of sixteen. She later moved to Texas where she finished her degree in speech 
pathology at University of Houston. In 1976, she received her JD from Rutgers 
University. In the following years, she taught at Rutgers Law, University of Houston Law 
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Center, University of Texas School of Law, University of Pennsylvania and finally 
Harvard Law School.
193
  
  Warren’s path to become a consumer advocate began in 1978, when she 
investigated a new Congressional statute that made it easier to file for bankruptcy. 
Attempting to understand the rationale behind this new legislation, Warren found that the 
greater part of those filing for bankruptcy were from hardworking middle-class families. 
She claimed that this discovery “changed her vision”.194 It was at this point that she 
became a champion for the middle class. In the subsequent years, Warren advised the 
new National Bankruptcy Review and lobbied against Congressional legislation that 
would restrict consumers’ ability to file for bankruptcy.  
 In November 2008, Warren was asked by Senator majority leader, Harry Reid, to 
head the Congressional Oversight Panel. The five-member panel would evaluate the 700 
billion government bailout, TARP, and related programs in monthly reports.
195
 Warren 
took to this post with enthusiasm. Unafraid to step on toes, she relentlessly grilled 
government officials, making enemies out of many, notably Timothy Geithner. In one 
hearing with Geithner, Warren pointedly asked, “AIG has received about 70 billion in 
TARP money and about 100 billion in loans from the Fed. Do you know where the 
money went?”196 She relentlessly interrogated the Secretary of Treasury in a style that 
has led her husband to characterize her as “a grandmother who can make grown men 
                                                        
193 Suzanna Andrews, “The Woman Who Knew Too Much,” Vanity Fair (November 2011) 
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/11/elizabeth-warren-201111 
194 Andrews, “The Woman Who Knew Too Much.” 
195 Sam Stein, “White House Taps Warren to Set Up Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,” 
Huffington Post, May 25, 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/15/white-house-taps-
warren_n_715291.html 
196 Andrews, “The Woman Who Knew Too Much.” 
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cry.”197 Some have speculated that Warren’s blunt personality, which isolated her from 
the banking sector as well as some federal regulators, caused her to lose the nomination 
for Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
198
  
 Despite the political infighting that prevented her from heading the CFPB, Warren 
proved instrumental in the lobby to create it. Warren’s push for an independent regulatory 
consumer agency began even before the 2008 financial crisis. In “Unsafe at Any Rate”, 
an article published in 2007, Warren called for the creation of a Financial Product Safety 
Commission, off of which the CFPB would later be modeled, an agency that would “be 
charged with responsibility to establish guidelines for consumer disclosure, collect and 
report data about the uses of different financial products, review new financial products 
for safety, and require modification of dangerous products before they can be marketed to 
the public. The agency could review mortgages, credit cards, car loans and a number of 
other financial products, such as life insurance and annuity contracts.”199 Following the 
2008 financial crisis, Warren advised the Obama administration to adopt a similar 
initiative. The Obama Administration’s proposal for a Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency in the White Paper thus emulated Warren’s earlier proposal. Taking up arms, 
Warren prepared to lead the consumer lobby in order to establish an independent 
regulatory consumer agency.  
 Throughout the campaign, Warren appeared on numerous television programs 
such as CNBC The Real Time or The Daily Show in order to advocate for a Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency. Like Nader, Warren stuck to her ideals, attempting to create 
                                                        
197 Jodi Kantor, “Behind Consumer Agency Idea, a Tireless Advocate” The New York Times, March 24, 
2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/business/25warren.html?_r=0 
198 See Andrews, “The Woman Who Knew Too Much.”  for one account of this 
199 Elizabeth Warren, “Unsafe at Any Rate,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas 5 (2007) 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/5/6528.php?page=all 
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a single, independent federal agency that would look out for consumer interests. Unlike 
Nader, however, Warren remained open to compromise as long as the integrity of the 
proposal was preserved. She accepted and worked with the bipartisan politics within 
Congress in order to advance the bill.  
 For example, one key point of contention in the debate over the structure of the 
CFPA was whether it would be a standalone agency or whether it would be housed 
within a preexisting regulatory agency. Cognizant of this Republican complaint, Warren 
voiced her willingness to compromise on this point on The Charlie Rose Show, stating 
“you’ve got to have an agency that’s ultimately independent, whether it’s located within 
the Fed, within the Treasury, the Department of Agriculture, or whether it sits in its own 
separate place.”200 Warren was willing to concede the standalone status of the agency, as 
long as the CFPA remained distinct from its parent organization in terms of regulatory 
capacity and budget. On March 15, 2010, Senator Dodd formally proposed placing the 
consumer agency inside of the Federal Reserve. Unlike Nader, who might have seen this 
as an “intolerable dilution” of the proposal, Warren saw the bigger picture and endorsed 
the proposal.  
 While both Ralph Nader and Elizabeth Warren were crucial reformers in the push 
for consumer protection, Warren’s willingness to compromise and work with the 
legislative process proved crucial to the success of the CFPA. Her tactics were often just 
as aggressive as Nader’s, tirelessly questioning government officials and insisting upon 
accountability from banks. She, however, did not make enemies out of friends 
instrumental to furthering her goal. Nader publically criticized and mocked President 
                                                        
200 The Charlie Rose Show, “Outrage and Financial Reform.” March 4, 2010 See transcript here: 
http://www.charlierose.com/download/transcript/10895 
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Carter throughout his push for a CPA when he felt that the President had not exerted 
sufficient effort on behalf of the cause. Conversely, Warren always praised Obama for his 
vision and his resolve. Where Nader isolated himself from Congress through his tactics 
and unwillingness to compromise, Warren remained firm in her key beliefs but 
understood that the legislative process requires give and take. Her vision and willingness 
to compromise ultimately paid off when the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau came 
into being with the passage of the Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial Protection Act of 
2010.  
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Part IV: Conclusion 
 
 
A Tale of Two Movements: 
Why was the push for a CFPA in 2010 successful whereas the 1997 effort failed?  
 
 Consumer movements, by their very nature, are difficult to organize and sustain. 
As Mancur Olson pointed out in his landmark study, the diffuse interests of a mass of 
individuals – like consumers – face a significant collective action problem since each 
individual has a strong incentive to free ride on the actions of others. In contrast, the 
concentrated well-organized interests of business organizations, such as the financial 
lobby, have a much easier time getting their voices heard and getting their preferred 
policies passed. In spite of the collective action problem, at least twice in the past half 
century significant consumer protection movements have emerged that sought to obtain 
greater protection for individual consumers: the push for the CPA in the 1970s and the 
CFPB after 2008. In both instances, as we have seen, a powerful sense of popular 
grievance coupled with professional entrepreneurs’ resource mobilization led to the 
formation of strong movements that lobbed for protection. Yet, despite some comparably 
favorable conditions, the consumer protection movement of the 1970s failed, while the 
movement today has, at least so far, has enjoyed some success. 
 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau established in 2010 does what 
Naderites hoped the Consumer Protection Agency would do in the 1970s. It seeks to 
protect consumers from predatory lending and ensure that they are informed buyers when 
entering into transactions. It seeks to represent the consumer interest on a federal level, 
fulfilling an advocacy function, as well as pass meaningful consumer regulation. The 
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establishment of this bureau has led some to label the Dodd-Frank and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 a win for ordinary consumers against the concentrated interests of 
the financial industry. What combination of factors enabled the movement today to 
achieve significant legislative victories that were denied in the 1970s? What does the 
comparison of these two movements tell us about such movements in general? What do 
they tell us in particular about the prospects for the sustainability of the reform movement 
today?  
 First and foremost, the importance of the opening of a policy window cannot be 
ignored. A problem, which serves as the independent variable in my analysis, is a 
necessary prerequisite to the placement of an issue upon the public policy agenda. In the 
1970s, the U.S. faced significant domestic financial unrest and international competition 
challenged its preeminence in the global system. Domestically, the U.S. economy 
underwent a period of substantial stagflation, soaring inflation without real growth. 
Internationally, the oil shocks from 1973-1974 caused energy prices to quadruple, 
stemming productivity of advanced industrialized countries. Meanwhile, confidence in 
the dollar fell due to an increasing budget deficit and poor economic domestic 
prospects.
201
 The problem that emerged in the 1970s thus was a faltering economy and 
inadequate macroeconomic tools in order to restore the U.S. economy to health. In 2008, 
the global financial crisis once again marked the failure of current regulatory policy. Both 
crises served as the original catalyst for reform, the signal to policy makers that the status 
quo was no longer acceptable and that major structural reforms were necessary to 
maintain a stable economic and political system.  
                                                        
201Alejandro Ruess, “What can the crisis of U.S. capitalism in the 1970s teach us about the current 
crisis and its possible outcomes?” Dollars & Sense (2009) 
http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2009/1109reuss.html 
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 Similarly, the absence of such an impetus prevented the consumerist movement 
from emerging when many other structural conditions fell into place, such as during the 
first part of the Clinton Administration, when for the first two years Democrats controlled 
the House and Senate, as well as the White House. Following the emergence of the 
problem, intervening variables unite within the public policy arena to determine the 
success of consumer legislation. These intervening variables can be classified into two 
categories: environmental and tactical.  
 As we saw from both cases, the emergence of a problem can cause the emergence 
of the most far-reaching environmental variable: ideological shifts that permeate every 
level of government and society. This environmental factor had at least three major 
impacts: on the framing of the debate, on the inclinations of the executive branch, and on 
Congress. First, while the emergence of deregulatory sentiment proved favorable to the 
business lobby’s agenda of maintaining the status quo in the 1970s, the resurgence of 
Keynesian thought following the 2008 financial crisis reinforced the consumer lobby’s 
mission to expand government intervention in the lobby. Whereas in the 1970s, it was the 
right that was able to frame the debate in terms of protecting the public from a pro-
regulatory elite, after 2008 the tide shifted and the Left was able to push a narrative that 
identified its regulatory agenda with the interests of the public. Second, ideological shifts 
can also influence and reinforce Presidential positions on a bill and public opinion of that 
bill. The deregulatory sentiment of the 1970s was in line with Republican Presidents’ 
existing inclination toward free market ideology and enhanced that tendency and may 
have weakened Carter’s resolve to push the regulatory agenda. In 2008, however, 
Keynesian norms reinforced Obama’s inclination to actively monitor the market. Finally, 
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ideological shifts influenced Congressional preference. In 1970s, it appealed to Southern 
Democrat’s more extreme party view and reinforced a division with the party that led to a 
filibuster.  
 Examining the environmental dimension of my model on a closer basis, one also 
has to take account of bicameral composition, Presidential support, and public support. I 
found the pivotal politics model provided critical insight on the interplay between the 
legislative and executive branch. While the 91
st
 through the 95
th
 Congresses as well as the 
111
th
 Congress had a Democratic majority, Democratic preferences in the 1970s were 
heterogeneous due to the prevalence of Southern Democrats whose preferences tended to 
more closely align with the Republican Party. The heterogeneity of preferences hindered 
the passage of consumer legislation, since the Democratic Party – the party that tended to 
support consumerism— was split into two coalitions. In the House of Representatives, 
the strong Southern Democratic presence in the Rules Committee structurally blocked the 
passage of consumer legislation, resulting in a minority from preventing the bill from 
reaching the floor. In the Senate, Southern Democrats proved pivotal when they mounted 
a successful filibuster from the 92
nd
 until the 94
th
 Congress. Conversely in 2010, the long 
decline of Southern Democrats in Congress due to Republican Realignment in the South 
created homogenous preferences within the Democratic Party. The Democratic majority 
in 111
th
 Congress thus proved crucial factor in advancing consumer legislation, since this 
majority coalition now unanimously favored the legislation.  
 According to a pivotal politics model, Presidential support proves to be a crucial 
environmental factor since a presidential veto can block the passage of legislation. In the 
1970s, Nixon and Ford’s implied veto created a second pivot point and contributed to 
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gridlock on the CPA bill. Conversely, President Obama active support for a CFPB 
furthered positive momentum on the bill. Presidential support additionally proved crucial 
when President Obama used a recess appointment in order to name Richard Cordray 
Director of the CFPB, blocking a Republican filibuster and ensuring the functionality of 
the agency.  
 A final environmental factor is public support for legislation. This factor is key to 
understanding the difference between the failed attempt of establishing a CPA under 
Carter and the successful establishment of the CFPB under Obama. A unified 
government emerged under both Carter and Obama. Both Democratic presidents were 
relatively progressive and were supported by Democratic Congresses. The crucial 
difference between the two cases was public support. Under Carter, deregulatory 
sentiments had firmly taken hold, causing public support for yet another bureaucratic 
agency to dwindle. Conversely, under Obama the public had turned against Wall Street 
and actively pushed for regulatory reform on a federal level. The lack of public impetus 
during Carter led to the death of the nearly decade long push for a CPA, whereas public 
support under Obama advanced the consumer cause.  
 Environmental factors only sets the stage for reform, the success of legislation 
ultimately depends upon the interplay between the environmental and tactical variables. 
Effective leadership of political entrepreneurs drives the tactical dimension of my model. 
As Kingdon notes, successful political entrepreneurs are able to couple their policy 
alternative with the change in the political stream. Following the 2008 crisis, Elizabeth 
Warren effectively accomplished this goal. Warren had been a strong supporter of the 
middle class for years. In 2007 Warren proposed the creation of a Financial Product 
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Safety Commission, an agency that would disseminate product research to consumers, 
regulate the products placed upon the market, and establish guidelines for consumer 
disclosure. Following the crisis, Warren paired this alternative with the national mood 
that had turned resoundingly against Wall Street in favor of consumer protection to 
successfully advance her cause. In the 1970s, however, Nader was unable to pair the push 
for an independent agency before the emergent deregulatory sentiment helped close the 
window during which legislation might have been passed. Instead of compromising and 
revising his policy goal to one that could fall in line with this national mood, such as the 
creation of a consumer protection agency within a pre-existing government agency, 
Nader pushed for the ideal. His aggressive tactics isolated former allies and ultimately 
proved unsuccessful.  
 The final tactical determinant of success within the cases was the strategy that 
each lobby employed in framing their proposal. In the 1970s, the business lobby 
successfully channeled the national mood and pioneered neoconservative rhetoric, which 
turned the strength of the consumer lobby into a weakness. They depicted consumerist 
goal of representing the buying interest on a federal level as an elitist ploy propagated by 
self-serving Naderites. Consumer rhetoric failed to adapt to the change in public 
sentiment and proved ineffective. Following the 2008 financial crisis, however, consumer 
rhetoric evolved to embody the public anger felt toward Wall Street. Consumerists 
utilized ad hominem attacks against bankers to create a divisive line between ordinary 
consumers and elitist bankers. This had the dual effect of creating a feeling of solidarity 
within the consumer movement and reformulating the consumer goal as a reactionary 
one. Consumers were reacting against Wall Street in order to advance the public good of 
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a well-functioning economy. Conversely, the anti-consumerist lobby continued to couch 
their claims in deregulatory sentiment, which no longer held as much weight with the 
public.  
 To summarize, in examining the successful formation of the CFPB and the failure 
to form a CPA, I have thus found that intervening variables combined favorably in the 
first case while the failed to do so for the second. As this study demonstrates, the success 
or failure of consumer movements depends on a myriad of factors. Broadly speaking, 
three factors were crucial to the success of consumer movements: the opening of a policy 
window via crucial events, the existence of favorable structural conditions in the policy 
making process (ideological environment, the composition of Congress, the commitment 
of the President, and bicameral composition), and finally effective leadership by political 
entrepreneurs and their ability to find legislative and framing strategies that help them 
advance their agenda within the broader environmental context. From this study, I do not 
think that we can pinpoint one factor that is crucial to the success of consumer 
movements generally, as the outcomes were dependent upon the confluence of all the 
environmental and tactical determinants.
202
  
 However, I do think that within the context of these two cases, two movements 
had particular significance. First on a macro level, the ideological shift in 1970 and 2008 
powerfully influenced every environmental component within the cases. The ideological 
shift additionally influenced the tactics available to political entrepreneurs, creating a 
proactive framing opportunity for the business lobby in the first case and the consumerist 
lobby in the latter. Secondly on a more micro level, the Republican Realignment in the 
South influenced bicameral composition resulting in heterogeneous preferences in the 
                                                        
202 Refer to Appendix C for a graphical depiction of the factors 
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Democratic Party in the first case and homogenous preferences within the second. This 
played a significant role in the passage of consumer legislation, since liberal Democrats 
tend to favor consumer protection. Thus, while no generalizable variable arises from 
these cases, I would argue that these two larger movements played a particularly 
significant role in the success of one consumer push and the failure of the other. 
 
Suggestions for Further Research:  
Theoretical Extensions 
 
 On a theoretical level, there are many questions that remain open following my 
study, such as the relative importance of the executive versus legislature in defining the 
agenda, or the interplay between ideology and actor preferences. The study here is merely 
a first-cut effort at defining a model that can capture the intricacies of the process by 
which discontent may or may not translate into policy outcomes. Among some of the 
issues that remain is getting a better gauge of the relative importance of the four 
environmental factors presented in this study. Do ideological shifts drive consumer 
movements or does Congressional composition? What are the factors that shape the 
commitment of the executive branch? Additionally, further research could test the extent 
to which this basic consumer model applies to comparable issues, such as environmental 
regulation or health care. Finally, while my study focused upon the enactment of 
consumer legislation on a federal level, future studies could examine the process on a 
state level. My hypothesis is that the consumer interest is more often mobilized at this 
level.  
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Practical Implications of the Study 
 While the 2008 financial crisis opened a policy window for consumerists, the 
question remains for how long? Of course we can’t reliably predict the timeframe, but to 
the extent that an ideological paradigm has shifted, one can reasonably assume that there 
will be continued opportunities for the consumer movement. This Keynesian counter-
revolution that stresses the importance of regulating the market will continue to make it 
easier for increased regulation to pass through Congress. One can imagine a point in the 
future, where the market has become overly saturated with regulation, perhaps at the 
expense of economic growth. This type of event could reverse the current norm. Until 
then, the environment seems primed for reform.  
 A second factor that could slow momentum on consumer legislation would be a 
change in presidential leadership. To what extent would a Republican President be able to 
turn back the clock? A Republican President certainly would adopt different policies, but 
reversing the enacted consumer legislation will be an uphill battle. The President does not 
act in a vacuum. Democratic resistance in Congress could help temper this reversal, and 
both public and expert opinion, which have been primed by the crisis, would pressure the 
President to move toward the societal status quo. For example, a Republican President 
would be hard pressed to ignore the sentiment of current Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, Ben Bernanke, who has publically voiced his support for increased financial 
regulation in order to prevent another global economic meltdown.
203
 Similarly, a 
Republican Congress will be tempered by public sentiment as well as the Presidential 
veto. The contentious character of politics ensures that every issue will be hard fought 
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and there will be no one-sided victories. In this environment, the skill of one individual 
acting as a political entrepreneur can make all the difference.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix A: Consumer Protection Agency Legislative History 
Bill Number Committee Report 
Issued 
Sponsor Main Provisions Outcome 
H.R. 6037 February 4, 1969 Rosenthal Version 1: Formed a Department of Consumer Affairs, 
cabinet level organization which would consolidate 
federal consumer functions under one roof 
Version 2: create an independent Consumer Protection 
Agency to promote and represent the consumer interest 
but would not consolidate the regulatory federal 
consumer activities under the CPA 
Nixon did not support the bill, petitioned to form 
an independent Consumer Protection Agency 
that would act in a advocacy capacity rather than 
regulatory one, Rosenthal reformulated the 
proposal  
H.R. 14785 November 12, 1969 Nixon 
Administration’s 
proposal 
Created a statutory office of Consumer Affairs within 
the Executive Office and a new Consumer Protection 
Division within the Department of Justice 
Rosenthal and Nixon’s proposals led to the 
formulation of H.R. 18067 and subsequently 
H.R. 18214 which was reported in full by the 
committee  
H.R. 18214 
(based upon 
Rosenthal and 
Nixon’s 
proposals) 
July 30, 1970 Dawson from 
Committee on 
Gov. Operations 
recommended 
passage 
Established a Office of Consumer Affairs within the 
Executive branch that could coordinate with the 
President as well as an independent Consumer 
Protection Agency that would collect and disseminate 
information on products as well as act as a 
representative of the buying interest when litigation is 
pending before regulatory bodies and the courts. Both 
agencies could field complaints on faulty products as 
well as fraudulent practices. Also formed a 15 member 
Consumer Advisory Council to advise the heads of the 
previous two agencies.  
House Rules Committee failed to report the bill 
to the floor for a vote by a 7-7 vote.  
S. 4459 October 12, 1970 Ribicoff from 
Committee on 
Gov. Operations 
recommends 
passage 
Established a Council of Consumer Advisors to express 
consumer interest within the executive branch and 
additionally established an Consumer Protection 
Agency which would test products and disseminate 
research, field complaints, testify on behalf of 
consumers  
Passed by a vote of 74-4  
H.R. 10835 September 30, 1971 Holifield from Established Office of Consumer Affairs in the Passed by a vote of 344-44  
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the Committee 
on Gov. 
Operations 
recommended 
passage 
Executive Office of the President as well as an 
independent CPA, this was similar to the 1971 bill 
except amendments to give the agency subpoena 
powers or to interfere or override other regulatory 
agency decisions were defeated  
S. 3970 September 8, 1972 Ribicoff from 
Committee on 
Gov. Operations 
recommended to 
the floor 
Established a Council of Consumer Advisers in the 
Executive Office of the President, created an 
independent Consumer Protection Agency and 
authorized a program of consumer protection grants 
Died in filibuster led by Ervin (D-NC) and Allen 
(D-AL), did not believe in the establishment of 
another agency, rather thought should review the 
current laws and revise them if consumer needs 
weren’t being met, refine the current bureaucracy 
rather than expand it 
3 cloture calls failed 
H.R. 13163 March 29, 1974 Holifield, 
Committee on 
Gov. Operations 
recommended to 
floor 
Established an independent Consumer Protection 
Agency to advocate for consumer interest on a federal 
level, handle complaints, to gather and disseminate 
product information and to advise the president  
House passed it 293-94 
S. 707 May 28, 1974 Ribicoff of 
Committee on 
Gov. Operations 
recommended to 
floor 
Established a Council of Consumer Advisers in the 
Executive Office of the President and established an 
independent non-regulatory CPA with authority to 
appear in proceedings, conduct and disseminate 
research on products, authorize a program of grants to 
State, local and private nonprofit consumer 
organzations 
Senate filibuster led again by Ervin and Allen led 
to the bill not being voted on, fell one short of the 
necessary 2/3 count on the cloture vote 
H.R. 7575 
 
July 30, 1975  Establishes an independent advocacy Agency for 
Consumer Protection in the Executive Branch to 
represent and protect consumer interest in proceedings 
before Federal regulatory bodies and courts 
Passed by 208 to 199 
S. 200 April 9, 1975 
 
 Establishes an independent Agency for Consumer 
Advocacy  
Successfully invoked cloture following a rule 
change, and passed the bill 61 to 28  
H.R. 6188 
 
April 1977  Established an independent Agency for Consumer 
Protection to conduct and disseminate product research, 
represent consumer interests before Federal agencies 
and courts and to field consumer complaints 
Failed to come to a vote when Congressional 
members realized it lacked public support 
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Appendix B: Survey Phrasing 
 
Harris Survey, Feb, 1978 
(Now let me read you some statements about the new proposed federal consumer protection agency. For each, tell me if you tend to 
agree or disagree)...Business is tied up now by mountains of red tape from government regulations, and a consumer protection agency 
will just add more red tape and keep business from doing its job. 
 
Shell Oil Company Survey, “Public & Worker Attitudes Toward Carcinogens & Cancer Risk Survey”, Apr, 1978 
There are two theories of how consumers can best be protected. One says that it is the free enterprise, competitive system. That is, the 
best protection for the consumer comes from firms competing with each other for your business. The other theory says that this idea 
about free competition is nice, but it never works out in reality. That, on the contrary, business gets together and devises ways to make 
profit at the consumer's expense--in some cases by all the businesses getting together to fix prices and product quality. These people 
say the only answer is a strong government watch dog role to keep business honest. Which general position would you say you lean 
toward--the free competition or the government watch dog role idea? 
 
GALLUP 
In your opinion, should there be more government regulation of consumer products and how they are sold, or less regulation than 
there is now? 
 
 
ROPER 
There is at present a proposal before the government for the creation of a Federal Consumer Protection Agency. This agency would 
have the power to act on behalf of the consumer in any kind of ruling by another government agency or in a court case where the 
Consumer Protection Agency believes consumer interest is involved. Some people say such an agency is a good idea because there 
would be much more action in protecting consumer interests. Others say such an agency is not a good idea because the government is 
into too many things now and consumer interests can be better protected and at lower cost by private and independent groups such as 
now exist. What do you think-that all things considered, the creation of a Federal Consumer Protection Agency is a good idea or not a 
good idea?  
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Appendix C: Key Findings 
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